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ABSTRACT
The importance of PTAs in today’s global economic order is unmistakable,
especially during the last fifteen years when their proliferation has dramatically
accelerated and their scope and structure have radically changed. However, the available
theoretical framework (international trade theories) from which their developmental
impact is assessed seems to be largely lagging behind. Hence, there is a crucial need for
more realistic assessments of their embedded developmental features because an
increasing number of developing countries are perceiving these agreements as one of the
key instruments to propel their long delayed economic development. In this thesis, I
strive to construct an alternative theoretical framework that can better adapt to current
PTAs’ structures, allowing a more realistic assessment of their economic impact on
developing countries. By following this alternative approach, I comparatively assess the
development drive of two of today’s most important PTAs, namely NAFTA and ASEAN.
The main conclusion echoes an increasing literature that warns developing countries from
engaging in “reciprocal” North-South PTAs, but at the same time, encourages them to
pursue South-South integration, which can prove to be beneficial for their development.
ii
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
The importance of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs)1 in today’s world trade
patterns is unmistakable. About half of total global trade is now taking place within
actual or prospective PTAs. In the case of the Western Hemisphere, for example, by the
year 2004 some 86% of total trade will be free of duty as the result of the implementation
of those PTAs already in effect. This does not take into account the future impact of the
new agreements currently under negotiation (Majluf, 2004). Although PTAs have been
an important part of the international economic maneuvering of many countries for quite
some time, after the ‘90s, their proliferation has dramatically accelerated (see figure I.1),
and their structures radically changed to include more trade and “non-trade” related
aspects and to increase the number of members involved.2
Figure I.1. PTAs Proliferation
RTAs in force by date of entry into force

N
o
.o
fR
T
A
s

250
200
150
100
50

20
08

20
04

20
00

19
96

19
92

19
88

19
84

19
80

19
76

19
72

19
68

19
64

19
60

19
56

19
52

19
48

0

Ye a r

Source: World Trade Organization (2008)
1

According to Bela Balassa (1961), PTAs are the weakest and initial form of economic integration
succeeded by Free Trade Areas, Custom Unions, Common Markets, and Economic Unions. Trade
literature refers to PTAs in other ways such as, Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) and Free Trade
Agreements (FTAs). For simplicity and coherence, all throughout this thesis, I will refer to them as PTAs.
Distinction will be made when necessary. See Panagariya (1998) for further discussion.

2

See Crawford and Fiorentino (2005) for a more detailed discussion on PTAs’ current trends.
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The initial formation of PTAs, as we know them today,3 was led by Western
Europe and dates back to the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) in 1951, which was later enlarged and complemented to become what we know
today as the European Union (EU). European success was immediately associated with
the idea that economic regional integration was strongly correlated with economic growth
and prosperity, but little attention was paid to how such success was accomplished.
Eventually, during the ‘60s, dozens of trade schemes, trying to mirror the
European experience, emerged in Africa and Latin America. These alliances covered all
five levels of integration set out by Bela Balassa (1961).4 But unlike the EEC in Europe
that flourished tremendously and expanded through the years, the replicas in Africa and
Latin America either missed their deadlines rapidly, collapsed completely (or almost
completely), or simply stagnated (Langhammer, 1992).
This initial wave of PTAs in Africa and Latin America has been recorded in
economic history as “Closed/Old Regionalism”, and “Shallow Integration” has been
recognized as its main cause for failure, which included problems that follow: i) ImportSubstitution-Industrialization that only created inward-looking and protectionist policies,
which lead to trade diversion; ii) the arrangements only involved developing countries
(DCs) that lack strong economic foundations, capital, and an industrial base to sustain
trade among themselves; iii) individual countries never fully committed to the integration
process quickly dissolving the driving mode of the accords; and iv) all the schemes did
3

Note that some form of preferential trade (North-South) took place during the colonial period between
colonizers and their colonies; however, discussing this system is out of the scope of this research. For
further discussion on this topic see Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008).
4

PTAs, Free Trade Areas, Custom Unions, Common Markets, and Economic Unions.
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not have any credible enforcement mechanism of the rules initially implemented,
enabling the commitment to vanish with time (Langhammer, 1992).
This disappointing experience of PTAs among DCs put off some of the initial
momentum of regional integration, leaving the practice mainly restricted to Europe.
However, as UNCTAD (2007b) explains, following the failure of international financial
institutions to manage the financial shocks towards the end of the ‘90s, and given the
slow progress of multilateral trade negotiations, regionalism was reborn, generating an
even stronger second proliferation wave5 and assuming a more than ever prominent place
in the international development agenda.
Unlike the initial closed/old regionalism that mainly focused on the reduction of
trade barriers among members (shallow-integration), this “New Regionalism” – as it is
often referred to in literature – arrived with a whole new philosophy, embracing the
concept of ”Deep Integration”. Deep integration has emerged as the underlying principle
of most of the current PTAs, prompting DCs to steer economic policies towards
integration into global markets and to harmonize their economic institutions, laws, and
regulations around a narrow but universal set of benchmarks of strong property rights,
open markets, and good governance.

Regardless of the “readiness” of the internal

economic environment of each country, the following of this path has been presented as
the best (and on some counts the only) way to ensure that the incentives and resources
generated by global markets will support and sustain growth and development at the local
level (UNCTAD, 2007b).
5

Some authors such as, Pomfret (2005) and Majluf (2004) have identified a third wave of regionalism,
starting during the last part of the ‘90s, which is characterized by its supra-regional scope. For the purpose
of this research, since the PTAs included here fall under the second wave of proliferation, this third wave
will not be discussed. For further details see the above authors.

3

Based on this rationale, new regionalism PTAs are taking a multi-tracked
approach to economic integration, expanding the trade areas and sectors dealt with in the
accord, as well as including many other non-trade related issues.

They go from a

straightforward trade agreement on goods and services to broader agreements as part of a
general economic partnership. They involve issues such as investment, government
procurement, environmental standards, labor standards, competition policy, and
intellectual property rights (IPR) that were never addressed before in “trade” talks.
There are different interpretations regarding the general driving force behind this
process,6 but as far as DCs are concerned, the overarching motive is the search for
effective policy instruments to achieve sustainable development through the insertion of
national economies into the globalization process. Also, a certain “domino effect”7 has
been playing an important role in propelling this trend, with countries increasingly
engaging in new PTAs as a means of counteracting perceived negative effects of
discrimination and marginalization as other countries form PTAs (Majluf, 2004). In a
way, as UNCTAD (2007b) explains, new regionalism reflects the tendency to perceive
globalization as a process whereby access to markets of the North and attracting foreign
investment is key to successful integration of DCs into the world economy.
Indeed, North-South PTAs (N-S PTAs) are the novel contribution of this new era
of economic integration, arguing that DCs can greatly benefit from partnering with
northern countries. But this new regionalism not only promises economic prosperity
under N-S PTAs, it also ventures into assuring that, to a certain extent, some South-South

6

See for example, Sampson and Woolcock, 2003; and Okamoto, 2003 (in Majluf, 2004).

7

The “Domino Effect” concept is largely attributed to Richard Baldwin (see Baldwin, 1993a).
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PTAs (S-S PTAs) might enhance economic development if deep integration is embraced,
unlike S-S PTAs from the ‘60s that only embraced shallow integration. Thus, these
popular development promises of new PTAs have enticed many DCs to seek closer
integration (even if only partially) and propel their economic development by partnering
with both northern and southern countries. In fact, this tendency is clearly reflected by
their active participation in about 50% of current PTAs (figure I.2).
Figure I.2. PTAs by Type of Partner.

Source: Crawford and Fiorentino (2005).

Nonetheless, despite the energetic involvement of DCs in these new PTAs, there
are still many “questions” about the goods and harms that they can bring to the
development process, since they tend to largely deviate from any theoretical predictions.
However, it is essential to note that most of the analysis on PTAs today is based on a
theoretical framework that is greatly behind their current structural evolution, thereby
falling far short from capturing and interpreting their actual outcomes. This is mainly
because, historically, trade has been the primary focus of PTAs (i.e. old regionalism) and
also of their study.

Consequently, current PTA analysis is mostly derived from

traditional trade theories and orthodox static economic analysis, which delimits any
assessment to the welfare-trade-effects that can result from a certain PTA.
But as mentioned before, current PTAs go far beyond trade matters, making the
current theoretical framework only inadequately explain their actual complex structures.
5

As UNCTAD (2007b) points out, this shortsighted analysis downplays or ignores
altogether many other fundamental forces behind the integration processes taking place in
most PTAs today, in favor of a singular fixation with the static welfare gains attached to a
maximal level of openness and improved allocation efficiency.
Hence, adequate research that can provide reliable assessments on a PTA’s
various effects is urgently needed, for it might be precisely their “ambiguous-nature” that
tempts DCs to invest considerably large economic, political, and institutional resources,
following a “just-in-case-approach” and hoping to foster economic development (Majluf,
2004). This is critical not only because these new PTAs might divert important and
scarce resources from other development strategies, but also because they might have a
negative impact, if they are not strategically embraced, by reducing the policy space
(potential PTA costs) available to DCs.
Therefore, this thesis seeks to investigate into what other factors and
circumstances are concerned with and/or altered by the current design of PTAs and how
they ultimately influence economic development. This requires taking a more dynamic
consideration of trade effects beyond welfare gains. But most importantly, this implies
shifting from an exclusive focus on trade to incorporating into the analysis other aspects
of the current economic integration wave, like international capital flows and their
potential dynamic (positive or negative) effects on development. This digression from
conventional thinking allows me to construct an alternative theoretical framework from
which one can more “realistically” capture the actual development drive of current PTAs.
In constructing this alternative approach, particular attention is dedicated to the
analysis of the impact on development of some aspects included in many PTAs today as
6

part of the deep integration process, like government procurement liberalization and IPR
protection, which are not considered in conventional assessments. However, some other
areas, such as labor and environmental standards, labor migration, and competition policy
are largely omitted from the discussions here. This is not because they are less important,
but because I have decided to keep the research more concise, and these aspects are less
related to the direction and arguments outlined in this thesis. Short reference will be
presented when necessary.
Moreover, my analysis shall be further reinforced by strongly considering the
overall legal and practical aspects of “negotiating” a PTA, such as, bargaining power and
general structural asymmetries among future members, which will likely influence the
final developmental outcome for the DC involved. I emphasize these issues because one
of my arguments is that it is not so important whether, in theory, PTAs are beneficial or
not. What largely determines their development drive is the outcome of the negotiations.
This alternative framework will then be applied to the assessment of two different
types of new regionalism PTAs, namely N-S and S-S. I have decided to utilize two
different types as opposed to only one, not only in order to render the study more
compelling and in line with my arguments, but mainly because conventional assessments,
mostly based on static trade models, have already drawn strong judgments on the
developmental features of each type, and have concluded that N-S PTAs are relatively
more beneficial for development than S-S PTAs.8
Thus, the overall scope of this thesis is to make two related contributions. First, I
strive to highlight some of the limitations and inadequacies of traditional PTA analysis in
8

See for example, Schiff and Winters (2003); Mayda and Steinberg (2006); and Lo Turco (2003).
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assessing the complex integration processes embedded in today’s PTAs. Second, by
assessing two different types of current PTAs, I expect to collect some evidence to render
my thesis compatible with my presumptions. In fact, I will show that by considering
several other factors and circumstances involved in the formation of a certain PTA,
oftentimes, the potentially positive welfare effects can be offset, causing the likely
reversal of the final result on development of that PTA for the DC.
The main conclusion of this research echoes increasing literature9 that slowly but
surely moves away from conventional assessments and into considering the many other
dynamics of current PTAs. The general message emerging from this literature is the
following: although economic integration (even if confined to few countries) can be a
positive force for economic development, it is not enough to guarantee it.

More

specifically, it is suggested that DCs should proceed carefully with regards to
“reciprocal” N-S PTAs given the large various asymmetries among members.

In

contrast, S-S PTAs, although they present the risk of minimal development benefits due
to the development level of all members, are still relatively more development-friendly,
simply because of the more leveled playing field, which increases the possibility of a
fairer distribution of the benefits.
The North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signed in 1994 by Canada,
the United States (US), and Mexico, was selected as the pioneer of its kind to represent
the N-S PTAs. An assessment of NAFTA’s features and its effects on Mexico as the
developing country is of particular relevance, as it has often been considered a model on
which to base other N-S PTAs (UNCTAD, 2007b).
9

See for example, UNCTAD (2005 and 2007b); Hoekman (2005); and Khor (2007); and Kreinin and
Plummer (2003) to mentioned just a few.

8

S-S PTAs are to be represented by the Association of South-East Asia Nations
(ASEAN), which is one of the most integrated S-S PTAs today. ASEAN was founded in
1967 as a political regional alliance that mostly ignored substantial economic integration
for the first 25 years. However, after 1992, with the formation of a series of trade and
investment schemes, such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the ASEAN
Investment Area (AIA), and ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Scheme (AICO), the
ASEAN economies decided to join the current regional integration trend. Although
ASEAN as a whole will serve as the umbrella agreement, the other complementary
schemes will be largely the subject of discussion in this research. ASEAN currently
includes ten members: Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam,
the Philippines, Brunei, Lao PDR, and Myanmar.10
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Chapter II thoroughly reviews the
traditional theories behind PTA analysis, highlighting some of their limitations and
presenting an alternative theoretical framework from which to draw eventual conclusions.
Chapter III applies this approach to several trade-related/market access issues in NAFTA
and AFTA assessing the respective accords’ impact on the development efforts of
Mexico and of the ASEAN economies. Chapter IV applies the same approach and
analyzes the impact that NAFTA investment provisions have had on Mexico’s
development prospects as well as the ASEAN investment schemes on the ASEAN
members. Finally, Chapter V thoroughly summarizes the actual development results that
Mexico and the ASEAN economies have experienced during their respective PTA era.

10

More information on NAFTA and on ASEAN and its different trade and investment schemes is provided
later throughout the corpus of the paper.

9

CHAPTER II: PRESENTING THE THEORIES
Mainstream economic theory suggests that “poorer” countries could benefit from
closer integration into the global economy.11 Indeed, as discussed in Chapter I, it seems
that many DCs today are “partially” following this suggestion by forming PTAs.
However, as previously mentioned, there are many uncertainties about the goods and
harms that PTAs can potentially bring to DCs. These uncertainties, I argue in this thesis,
are largely derived from the inadequate and limited theories that analyze their effects.
Hence, in this chapter, it is essential to briefly present the ABCs of these theories in order
to identify where their inadequacies and limitations are born. This should allow me to
build an alternative theoretical framework that can better adapt to the complex structures
of current PTAs and facilitate a more realistic assessment of their development drive.

2.1. The Traditional Theoretical Framework for PTA Analysis
Traditionally, as their name implies, PTAs have been primarily concerned with
trade, and so, trade has been the focus of their study. Thus, international trade theory has
functioned as the theoretical backbone for their analysis. In order to support my claim
about the limitations of current PTA analysis, I need to briefly present the foundations of
traditional trade theory so as to illustrate how it perceives trade interaction among
countries as a welfare improving mechanism and a potential development strategy.
11

See for example, World Bank (2005). Note, however, that these suggestions are mostly based on
mainstream trade theory, which lacks substantial empirical support (see Deraniyagala and Fine, 2001).
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2.1.1. Traditional Trade Theories (TTT)
The origins of traditional trade theories (TTT) can be traced back to the important
contributions of two famous British economists, Adam Smith (1776) and David Ricardo
(1817). Adam Smith strongly influenced current trade theories with his well-known
concepts of the Invisible-Hand, the Self-Interest Behavior, and the Absolute Advantage.
Basically, Adam Smith argued that if every individual and/or nation-state alike, pursuing
their own interest, focused on doing what they are best at, economic activity would lead
to maximization of resources, advancement of public welfare, and equality.

David

Ricardo, the soul founder of TTT, consolidated the benefits of international trade with his
theory of Comparative Advantage. Unlike Smith, Ricardo mainly showed that it was not
necessary to enjoy an absolute advantage for two nations to mutually benefit from trade.
Instead, it was only necessary to enjoy a comparative advantage in the production of a
certain commodity over the trading partner for both to obtain substantial welfare gains.
The basic idea behind these economist’s principles was simple: two nations will
voluntarily engage in trade if, and only if, they both benefit from doing so; hence, any
obstacles – managed trade or government interventions – that prohibits, restricts, or tax
their trade will only diminish the potential welfare improving gains. This presented the
first moves away from a mercantilist approach to trade which view trade as a win-lose
situation instead of a win-win opportunity.
Largely, these principles have represented, to this day, the underlying foundations
of TTT and the perception of international trade as a welfare improving practice. There
are two central arguments upon which most current trade models are based in one way or
another. These arguments present two slightly different approaches for the basis of trade,
11

but basically lead to the same outcome – increased welfare resulting from the passage
from one “steady state” to a better one by efficiently reshuffling the available resources in
the economy, increasing productivity, welfare, and living standards (see figure II.1).
The first one is the classical argument and structures its basis for trade as follows:
two countries possess their own respective scarce amount of resources to allocate among
different production utilizations, generating a certain Production-Possibility-Frontier
(PPF). The respective resources are assumed to be given, and so are the countries’
consumption patterns. Labor is the only factor of production and is completely mobile
between alternative uses within each country, but not between the two countries. The
prices of commodities are solely based on their relative labor cost, which is the same
among alternative uses within a country. The only difference, which ultimately creates
the incentive for trade in the classical model, is the production processes (technology)
that differ between the two countries, although, this technology is fixed for each country
and non-transferable between them.
Secondly, during the early 1900s, with the arrival of neoclassical economics, new
advancements were presented to the classical argument, trying to further reinforce the
idea that countries could be better off with trade than in autarky. One particular model
stands out: the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model which presented a different argument for
the basis for trade, but carried on the classical set up in many respects. Essentially, this
model argues that countries possess relatively different factor endowments (capital and
labor) for the production of goods and services, which ultimately determines a country’s
comparative advantage. Countries have a comparative advantage in those goods for
which the required factors of production are relatively abundant locally. This is because,
12

in this model, the prices of goods and services are ultimately determined by the prices of
their inputs (rent and wages). Goods and services that require inputs that are locally
abundant will be cheaper to produce and export than those goods and services that require
inputs that are locally scarce. The basis for trade in the H-O model are exclusively based
on factors endowment differences that yield different prices, since, unlike the classical
model, technologies are assumed to be identical between the two countries.12
Practically, if the classical and H-O model rationales are put together, the basis for
trade arises from differences in production possibilities (different technologies and/or
factor endowments) that yield different price sets among potential trading partners.13
Welfare gains then generate in essentially two ways: first, welfare trade gains result from
exchange (consumption gains) when consumers are exposed to new relative lower prices
coming from the trading partner. This allows consumers from country A to reach a
higher indifference community curve not possible under autarky (moving from CI1 to CI2
in figure II.1). Second, welfare trade gains generate from specialization (production
gains), resulting from resource allocation towards the production of the relatively more
efficient commodity, increasing overall production efficiency (moving from E to E’ in
figure II.1) (Appleyard and Field, 2001).
12

Jayme (2001, p. 10) remains us, however, that “there is an extensive discussion in international trade
literature about the validity of the H-O model. The most known limitation of this is the Leontief Paradox.
Leontief (1953) found that the US (a capital-abundant country) exported labor-intensive commodities and
imported capital-intensive ones, which reverts the H-O arguments”. Nonetheless, the factor endowment
rationale is still strongly evoked today to select future trading partners among countries, especially for N-S
PTAs where there are larger factor endowments differences between future members. A N-S PTA could
result mutually beneficial because member countries could more efficiently exploit their respective relative
abundant-factors of production.
13

Note that in the classical and H-O models the basis for trade take into consideration only supply
conditions, assuming similar consumption patterns between countries. However, there are also strong
neoclassical arguments that present the basis for trade considering differences in demand conditions that
can generate further gains from trade even between countries with similar production capacities (PPF), see
Appleyard and Field (2001) for further discussion.
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The following standard trade diagram represents a graphic illustration of the
positive welfare effects embedded in TTT, setting the basic argument for countries to
pursue trade interaction as opposed to remain in autarky (figure II.1).
Figure II.1. Welfare Effects of Trade on a Country (A)

In autarky, country A is in equilibrium at point E, producing and consuming at the maximum level
possible. With the opening of trade, it now faces the international prices, (Px/Py)2. Given the relative
higher international price of the X good, production moves to E’, the point of tangency between the
international prices and the PPF. At the same time, the Y good is relatively less expensive at
international prices, so consumers increase their relative consumption of it and begin consuming at
point C’, where the terms of trade are tangent to the highest community indifference curve possible.
C’ lies outside the PPF and is obtained by exporting the amount x3x2 of the X good and exchanging it
for y2y3 imports of the Y good. The country is clearly better off because trade permits it to consume on
the higher indifference curve CI2. The similar (opposite) effects occur for the trading partner (Country
B), which specializes in the production of good Y, (Source: Appleyard and Field (2001, p. 84).

Of course, this is an over simplistic representation of the arguments behind TTT
and without a doubt there is a lot more to the content of trade theory.14 However, for the
purpose of my argument this illustration suffices to demonstrate that, according to TTT,
the key objective of a PTA should be to increase trade among members to derive welfare
gains.

In other words, if a PTA increases trade among members, it then becomes

conclusive that both countries will be better off. But the question is, can a simple welfare
improvement derived from resource allocation be considered as a step forward to enhance
economic development?
14

For a more extensive textbook version of trade theory, see for example, Appleyard and Field (2001).
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2.1.2. Economic Development and TTT
As discussed in Chapter I, economic development is the primary objective of DCs
when forming PTAs. TTT predict that increased trade improves the well-being of a
country. By definition, the goal of PTAs is to increase trade among members. Thus,
according to TTT, PTAs could propel development. Note, however, that in a TTT
framework, welfare gains derived from trade are subject to a series of assumptions hard
to overlook when a certain PTA is to function as a motor for development. Especially
because with these assumptions TTT fall short in explaining and incorporating obvious
economic characteristics of most DCs, rendering their arguments, from a DC’s point of
view, largely incomplete and oftentimes irrelevant. Therefore, it is important to point out
some of these assumptions that are particularly relevant to DCs when opting for a PTA as
a means to overcome some of the chronic features of underdevelopment such as, scarce
technology and limited industrial resources to spur growth and employment rates.
First of all, TTT assume “full-employment” of factors of production. By doing
so, they do not consider the persistently high levels of unemployment in most DCs.15 As
Stiglitz and Charlton (2005) point out, with high unemployment one does not need to
redeploy resources to put more resources into the efficient sectors (i.e. export sectors).
One simply needs to employ hitherto unused resources. A simple liberalization of trade
might not lower unemployment, especially in DCs where oftentimes the effective sectors
lack the supply capacity to expand enough and absorb not only released resources, but

15

For example, Stiglitz and Charlton (2005) report that in 2001 average unemployment rates reached
14.4% in Africa, 12.6% in transition economies, and 10% in Latin America. Moreover, he argues that such
statistics, however, often under-represent the true level of unemployment – for instance, the prevalent high
levels of disguised unemployment.
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also initially idle ones. Trade liberalization might only lead the economy from lowproductivity to zero-productivity – more unemployment.
Nonetheless, TTT strongly emphasize that the objective of trade liberalization is
not to create additional jobs, but to increase standards of living by allowing countries to
specialize in areas of comparative advantage. Monetary and fiscal policy should, in
principle, enable countries to maintain the economy at nearly full-employment (Stiglitz
and Charlton, 2005).

For example, governments are supposed to compensate the

negatively affected labor force through domestic redistribution policies such as, income
taxes , retraining programs, and unemployment assistance. However, in practice, given
the almost inexistent unemployment safety nets in most DCs,16 the faulty tax-collecting
systems to improve them,17 and the low level of education investment,18 it is very likely
that displaced workers will remain displaced after reallocation process.
Moreover, in relation to the employment of resources, not only full employment is
assumed in TTT when a country opens up to trade, but it is also assumed that such
resources will be costless and immediately reallocated. However, it is quite unrealistic to
assume that a farmer will immediately and costlessly make him/herself available in an
assembly plant where employment has been created from the manufacturing sector’s
expansion. It is more likely that even if he or she is able to migrate, he or she will look
for employment in the “same” sector (agriculture in this case, given the prior skill set),
16

Townsend (2007) reports that most OECD countries spend in public social security in average about 15%
of their GDP compared to about 2% in most DCs.

17

In average most OECD countries fund their public social security expending in average about 65% from
tax-revenue, while most DCs (with the exception of China) average from 8-14% (Townsend, 2007).

18

Soubbotina and Sheram (2000) report that although DCs are devoting a larger share of their GDP to
education efforts than in the past, they are still lagging behind developed countries – 3.3% and 5.4%
respectively. Moreover, developed countries spend large amounts on private education subsidies.
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where available. The migration would likely be towards the trading partner that has
expanded this sector consequent upon a PTA. This is, oftentimes, one of the causes of
international migration as opposed to internal migration (see Jansen and Lee, 2007).
Secondly, both the classical and the H-O models allow for the reallocation of the
factors of production within the country but do not allow for mobility of the same across
borders. This highlights an important limitation of TTT on analyzing the dynamics of
current PTAs where capital is highly mobile across borders through foreign investments,
but labor is not yet free to move internationally.

This strongly favors the capital-

abundant member of the PTA (the developed country), allowing it to move its resources
to where they can be more efficiently employed, but disadvantages the labor-abundant
member (the DC) by restricting the reallocation of labor to its own borders.
Thirdly, the H-O model, in particular, assumes identical production technologies
across countries.

Again, this model fails to capture a rather vital characteristic of

underdevelopment – the lack of an efficient technological base in the economies of most
DCs. A theory that takes it as a given is particularly unattractive to DCs, because most
DCs tend to rely on exogenous technical changes which mostly occur in industrialized
countries (Stewart, 1992).19 Hence, if PTAs are to be taken as a vehicle for development,
there has to be some technology transmission variable that might allow technology
spillovers from innovators to absorbers if a technological upgrading is to take place.
Lastly, TTT assume similar consumption patterns among trading partners. This
implies, as Jayme (2001) points out, that demand structures are identical in all trading
countries, which means that goods and services are consumed at given relative prices and
19

See Lall (2000b) for further discussion on technology upgrading and development.
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independent of income levels. However, if consumption patterns and preferences are
purely measured by income levels, it becomes evident that high-income industrialized
countries would have different preferences than low-income DCs.20 This is because most
DCs are characterized by unskilled, low-technology, and labor-intensive production
processes, generating low-income-characteristics goods, which might face limitations in
penetrating high-income consumers from industrialized countries (see Chapter III).
In conclusion, once the general rationales of TTT are confronted with a dose of
reality, it is extremely difficult to elaborate a correlation between PTAs and development
through the TTT lens, especially because their very assumptions create a sort of
retroactive and stationary mode of engaging in international trade and ignore altogether
other aspects of economic integration such as capital and labor flows. As an overall
message, TTT suggest that countries should exploit their initial comparative advantages
and remain stagnant in doing so because it is initially beneficial. These theories do not
leave much space for enhancing a country’s initial comparative advantage and
progressively move forward. Otherwise, the incentive of welfare gains from trade is no
longer relevant.

As Stewart (1992, p. 70) states, “the prime concern of DCs is

development (i.e. to change their factor endowments, their incomes, and their
consumptions patterns), they tend to find a theory, such as the H-O, which assumes all
these away as given and unchanging, particularly unattractive”.

20

This reasoning is largely reflected in the works of Linder (1961) and the new trade theories of
“Preference Similarities”, in which is explained that differentiated products are developed for the home
market in accordance with domestic preferences. These preferences depend in large on income levels.
Hence, the products are exported to markets with similar tastes (Stewart, 1992).
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2.1.3. The Application of TTT to PTA Assessments
Notwithstanding the irrelevance of TTT to explain how welfare improvements
derived from increased trade are to propel development and the fact that increasing trade
is no longer the exclusive goal of today’s PTAs, the TTT framework still largely function
as the primary benchmark for assessing the effects of most PTAs today. Indeed, most
assessments of current PTAs focus on whether and how their particular mixture of trade
liberalization and discrimination alters economic welfare by creating or diverting trade.
These advancements on PTA assessments are mainly attributed to the seminal
works of Jacob Viner (1950) who noted that, since PTAs liberalized trade preferentially,
they “create”, on one hand, new trade between PTA members while, they “divert” trade,
on the other. The former effect takes place whenever a PTA leads to a shift in product
origin from a domestic producer whose resource costs are higher to a member producer
whose resource costs are lower. This shift represents a movement in the direction of
efficient resource allocation and thus is presumably beneficial for welfare. The latter
effect takes place whenever there is a shift in product origin from a non-member producer
whose resource costs are lower to a member country producer whose resource costs are
higher. This movement represents a movement away from efficient resource allocation
and could reduce welfare. Since both trade creation and trade diversion are possible
within a certain PTA, PTAs are considered “second-best” because they represent only a
partial movement to free trade (Appleyard and Field, 2001).21
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In fact, opponents of PTAs argue that these discriminatory schemes distract (or even subtract) from the
optimal welfare gains that could be obtained from a truly open global system. As such, PTAs are seen as
“stumbling blocs” as opposed to “building blocs”. An adequate discussion of these arguments is out of my
scope here, for more details see for example, Krueger (1999a) and Bhagwati (1992).
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Whether or not PTAs produce net welfare benefits to member countries is still an
empirical issue. However, the majority of the few studies undertaken22 have tended to
report small effects on both members and non-members, with net trade creation being the
more likely outcome, and generally positive, although small, overall welfare gains,
specially for N-S PTAs (UNCTAD, 2007b). Nevertheless, several empirical studies on
S-S PTAs have resulted in trade diversion and hence, welfare losses (see below).
However, is this predominant case of trade creation and trade diversion, mainly
based on static welfare effects, sufficient to truly capture and assess the development
drive of current PTAs? Certainly not, I argue in this thesis. Rather, a broader approach
that incorporates other aspects included in current PTAs on an individual PTA basis
could be proven more appropriate.
There is one thing in common between assessing a certain PTA from a static
perspective and assessing it with an alternative approach, as the approach used in this
research. That is, a different PTA (i.e. N-S and S-S) will result in a different overall
developmental outcome for the DC, but that outcome might be the opposite.

For

example, in a static assessment, N-S PTAs might offer welfare gains because it
potentially “creates” trade among members. However, as discussed in more detail below,
increased trade resulting from the PTA does not necessarily imply increased market
access for goods and services that can beneficially influence the development of the DC.
Rather, other factors and circumstances (potential PTA costs), which are neglected in
static assessments, can easily turn around the net outcome of a N-S PTA, and potentially
even hinder the development efforts of the DC involved.
22

See for example, Eicher et. al. (2007); Fugazza and Vanzetti (2006); Cernat (2003); and Mayda and
Steinberg (2006).
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In contrast, the developmental outcome of S-S PTAs from a static assessment is
quite inconclusive. Some studies, such as Lo Turco (2003) and Mayda and Steinberg
(2006) conclude that S-S PTAs mostly lead to slower growth among members because of
their potential to “divert” trade. Other assessments, such as Fugazza and Vanzetti (2006)
and Cernat (2003), report enormous potentials for trade creation and thus welfare gains.23
However, again, these assessments fail to consider any other factors and circumstances in
PTAs beyond trade that can reveal extra developmental potentials from S-S PTAs,
perhaps not by increasing the gains, but by reducing the costs of trade liberalization.

2.2. Constructing an Alternative Approach to PTA Analysis
It is now evident that, for the purpose of this research, a complementary
theoretical approach to static welfare gains from trade has to be constructed in order to
present a theoretical framework from which to improve the general understanding of how
economic integration might enhance economic development. Because, as pointed out by
some,24 a truly economic integration process includes many other aspects beyond trade
matters that cannot be fully captured by conventional assessments. Perhaps, PTAs are not
precisely to be considered as full economic integration, but they do currently include
many other aspects beyond trade integration (Chapter I).

23

For example, these studies report that, since tariffs among DCs in average are higher (11.1%) compared
to (4.3%) between developed countries, there is more space for further liberalization. Moreover, trade
among DCs has grown faster than both between developed countries and/or DCs and developed countries,
12.5%, 7%, 9.8% respectively. These studies estimate that a 10% tariff cut could be associated with a 1.6%
increase in world exports between DCs. This could be translated as additional US$5.7 billion net gains;
interestingly, the data indicates that an equivalent tariff reduction in N-N and/or N-S trade could have a
smaller impact on trade flows and welfare gains. Welfare gains could total as much as US$35 billion from
a S-S liberalization, compared to US$22 billion from a N-S liberalization (Fugazza and Vanzetti, 2006).
24

See for example, Kondonassis (2001).
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By no means can it be possible to construct an alternative approach that does full
justice to measuring the effects of PTAs on development. However, to restrict any
evaluation to a single variable (trade effects) might not be quite enlightening either. As
far as DCs are concerned, a “PTA Theory” needs to consider general development effects
beyond the obvious welfare gains from allocation efficiency.

These include

accumulation of physical and human capital, learning to develop future endowments to
change the initial comparative advantages, employment, and technology acquisition
(Stewart, 1992). Therefore, in this section, not only is a dynamic approach as opposed to
static approach to the effects of increased trade embraced, but also an additional
important aspect of economic integration is considered – international capital flows.
There is increasing literature that has attempted to capture both the economic
effects of the so-called “dynamic” trade gains and the implications, beneficial or harmful,
resulting from international capital flows, but this literature has not yet been specifically
directed towards the study of PTAs and development.
On one hand, some studies,25 mostly derived from the marriage between new
trade and endogenous growth theories, have tried to individualize these dynamic trade
gains, mainly by highlighting two concepts: “scale economies” and what is referred to as
“trade-knowledge”. The former, as Jayme (2001) points out, plays the core argument of
new trade theories, which strongly stress the importance of “increasing” returns to scale
as a determinant factor for long-term growth.26 The latter refers to additional forms of
capital, human capital and technology, that can endogenously propel long-run growth and
25

See for example, Baldwin (1993b); Nordas et. al. (2006); Wacziarg (2001); and Venables (2001).

26

However, Deraniyagala and Fine (2001, p. 811) point out that if sectors characterized by scale economies
are not affected by the liberalization process, this type of dynamic gain will not materialize.
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development.27 On the other hand, several studies28 have identified the important role
that international capital flows are currently playing in the domestic-investmentdynamics of most DCs. Most importantly, these flows have been widely recognized to
potentially offer an array of “dynamic side” benefits for economic development.
But how can the formation of a PTA allow these dynamic benefits to be directed
towards development? For the purpose of these research, I have selected two rather
common “delivery-vehicles” (as I will refer to them throughout this paper) that could
facilitate the flow. These are “Market Access” and “Foreign Investment”, which I will
discuss in turn below, aiming at constructing a more “realistic” theoretical framework
from which to evaluate the impact of PTAs on economic development.

2.2.1. Delivery-Vehicles: Market Access and Foreign Investment
Today, the two main reasons for DCs to form PTAs are to obtain increased access
to the partner’s markets and to attract foreign investments. Hence, it is essential to
analyze the potential (positive or negative) effects on development that this implies.

A). Market Access:

As Cadot et. al. (2005) point out, the perception of

“increased market access” in recent years has gained a lot of popularity in international
trade discussions as one of the core conditions to obtain from economic integration by
DCs, for that it is heralded as the key for their successful integration into the world
27

These concepts have been largely pioneered by several authors such as, Krugman (1990); Grossman and
Helpman (1990; 1991); Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991).
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See for example, Lall and Narula (2004); UNCTAD, (1999; 2006d); and Prasad, Kose, Rogoff and Wei
(2006) (in Plummer and Cheong, 2008, p. 1).
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market.

From a development perspective, market access is basically seen as the

opportunity to overcome the “smallness” chronic problem of many DCs’ domestic
markets and the many drawbacks that a small market represents (see UNCTAD, 2005).
The formation of a PTA offers a real and immediate opportunity to “enlarge” the size of
the market and reap the diverse benefits that come with it. As such, increased market
access represents one of the “delivery-vehicles” that could bring about several dynamic
benefits from international trade, such as physical capital formation, employment, and
skill and technology spillovers (see next section).29
However, increasing literature30 warns of the fact that an enlarged market
resulting from a PTA does not necessarily imply actual increased market access for those
sectors that can benefit the development prospects of DCs. The formation of a PTA
might well result only in net increased trade flows for the trading bloc, but oftentimes,
market access for many DCs to the partner’s markets is restricted by many other factors,
such as supply capacity constraints, and/or consumption patterns differences (see below).
Moreover, market access for the DC can be further influenced by the type of PTA
that is formed (N-S or S-S). Certain characteristics of each type of PTA will have a
determinant impact on the level of market access that the DC obtains. For example, the
principle of reciprocity that both N-S and S-S embrace, the restrictiveness of Rules of
Origin (RoO), and any trade distorting measures such as subsidies and other non-trade
barriers will all have an impact (see Chapter III, UNCTAD, 2007b, and Khor, 2007).
29

Moreover, Bernard et. al. (2007) argue that, with an enlarged market, aggregate productivity will raise
from the survival and expansion of effective firms. Note, however, that this argument assumes that DCs
have effective firms capable of expansion. Also, this argument does not allow for weak firms to evolve.
30

See for example, Cadot et. al. (2005); and Estevadeordal (1999); and UNCTAD (2005).
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B). Foreign Investment: Few doubt that investment is one of the most, if not the
most, determinant factor for growth and development.31 Nonetheless, it is also true that
one of the main constraints of most DCs is the lack of both public and private adequate
domestic savings to generate the necessary investments. Recent findings show, on one
hand, that overall public investment has been declining, as a share of GDP, in the
developing world over the past two decades.

On the other hand, recent research

demonstrates that private domestic investment has not compensated for the drop of public
investment as it was hoped (Roy, et al., 2006).
This has permitted the role of Transnational Corporations (TNCs), as source of
capital for DCs, to grow over time (Lall and Narula, 2004). This, as mentioned before,
has rendered foreign investment from TNCs (perhaps the most important form of
international capital flows) crucial in calculating the dynamic benefits that can be
obtained by DCs from a PTA, making it another important delivery-vehicle of benefits
from economic integration and/or PTAs.
Foreign capital inflows into DCs from TNCs come mainly in two forms, namely
Portfolio Investments and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), which are further
subdivided into Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) and Greenfield Projects.32

The

effects on development resulting from these types of foreign investment greatly vary
from one another. The former, for example, has been identified as having an ambiguous

31

Robust empirical evidence is reported in UNCTAD (2003, p. 61) showing that investment is one of the
few variables that independently and significantly impact the rate of economic growth. These include:
Levine and Renelt (1992); Sala-i-Martin (1997); and Ros (2000).

32

According to UNCTAD, OECD, and IMF standards, Portfolio Investment refers to equity ownership of a
company without obtaining the managerial control of the entity. FDI gives managerial control of the entity
to the foreign investor.
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and immeasurable impact on development, for that international capital markets are quite
volatile and their final impact on an economy is quite difficult to capture.33 Therefore, I
will largely omit any comprehensive discussion of this type of foreign investment in this
research. However, reference will be made when necessary.
The latter, on the other hand, has been largely identified as the main facilitator of
dynamic development gains for DCs, mainly in the form of Greenfield projects, which in
turn, according to UNCTAD (1999), enter an economy in four main types: i) naturalresource-seeking investments, ii) market-seeking investments, iii) strategic-asset-seeking
investment, and iv) efficiency-seeking investments. Note that each of these types of FDI
will generate different kinds of externalities for the host economy in technology,
employment, and physical and human capital accumulation (see below).
However, DCs have to attract such investments in the first place, which mainly
depends on domestic capabilities,34 matching the wants and needs of foreign investors.
Thus, it is very important to strongly emphasize that the mere formation of a certain PTA
with investment provisions and/or separate investment schemes will not automatically
guarantee inflows of foreign investment. Indeed, there is little evidence supporting this
argument.35 Rather, FDI tends to respond where local capabilities are strong when trade
liberalization takes place and feeblest where they are weak (Lall and Narula, 2004).

33

See for example, Weisskopf, 1972 (in UNCTAD, 1999, p. 31).

34

See for example, UNCTAD (1999); Miyamoto (2003); and Plummer and Cheong (2008) for a detailed
discussion on FDI determinants.

35

UNCTAD (1998), Hallward-Driemeier (2002) (in Stiglitz and Charlton, 2005, p. 150), and more recently
Plummer and Cheong (2008) found little evidence that Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) increased
foreign investment inflows into DCs. However, Lesher and Miroudot (2006) make an important distinction
between BITs and investment “provisions” in PTAs, reporting that the former does not have an impact on
FDI flows, but that the latter are positively associated with FDI flows.
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Nonetheless, the fact that DCs enter a certain PTA, oftentimes is perceived by
foreign investors as a positive factor that might increase the rate of return to their
investments. In addition, as reported by UNCTAD (1999),36 there are certain locationspecific advantages of individual countries that play an important role in attracting FDI.
Among these are some that can be enhanced by PTAs, such as the size of the market in
which TNCs can operate allowing the realization of scale economics, productivity of
local producers increased from resource allocation, and local cost-efficient factors of
production made more available by the opening of the economy.
Yet, attracting FDI is only the first part of the process that allows DCs to benefit,
a process that is subject to numerous conditions. For example, the “quality” of the FDI
generates more benefits as opposed to the “quantity”. Moreover, as in the case of market
access, there are some particular characteristics embraced in many PTAs that include
investment provisions, such as expropriation clauses, national treatment, performance
requirements, and transfer-pricing,37 that will further influence the level of benefits that
can be obtained from increased inward FDI, enhancing or hindering its impact on
development. Furthermore, UNCTAD (2006d) points out that the origin (developed or
DCs) of inward FDI might further influence its benefits to the host economy. Ultimately,
once more and better inward FDI has been attracted, the final and real impact on
development will largely depend on the host-economy’s absorbing capacity and the
overall proactive involvement of domestic governments to ensure the realization of such
benefits (see section 2.2.3).

36

This reasoning is largely attributed to Dunning (1981, 1993a, and 1993b) (UNCTAD, 1999, p. 5)

37

See chapter IV for further discussion as well as Khor (2007); and UNCTAD (2007b).

27

2.2.2. “Potential Dynamic” Gains from PTAs
There are four potential dynamic sets of gains that can directly and positively
affect the development efforts of DCs when entering a PTA. Both market access and FDI
can contribute in delivering them in several ways.

These include physical capital

formation and economic activity, employment, technology spillovers, and human capital
and skill enhancement, which are discussed in turn below.

1). Physical Capital Formation and Economic Activity:
One of the fundamental teachings of neoclassical growth theories is the
indispensable role of physical capital accumulation in the enhancement of economic
growth. Though still not sufficient, as later argued by endogenous growth theories, it is
still a determinant factor of growth (UNCTAD, 2007b). PTAs, by enlarging the market
and possibly attracting FDI, can play a determinant role in forming new physical capital.
First, an enlarged market allows DC’s producers to reap larger gains from scale
economies. According to Ethier (in Stewart, 1992, p. 89), “the size of the global market
is the limiting factor in determining specialization and economies of scale”. Gains from
scale economies can potentially increase profits and the rate of private investment, which
can generate physical capital (UNCTAD, 2003). However, as noted by Deraniyagala and
Fine (2001), these gains are subject to the number of industries characterized by scale
economies in the country and to the positive inclusion of those industries in the
liberalization process. Moreover, Bernard et. al. (2007) argue that trade liberalization
triggers a certain reallocation of economic activity across firms, which can raise
aggregate productivity from the expansion of high-productivity firms and the contraction
28

of low-productivity firms. Nonetheless, DCs can be disadvantaged (i.e. in a N-S PTA) in
benefiting from both scale economies and/or aggregate productivity, since they typically
have few industries and firms that can exploit these benefits.
Secondly, foreign investment inflows potentially attracted by the PTA, as
discussed previously, might directly affect the domestic rate of savings and investment,
generating physical capital.

However, the impact might be small, especially if the

inflows are in the form of portfolio investments. For example, UNCTAD (1999) reports
that, in the ‘90s, large capital inflows into several DCs did not generally lead to increases
in total investment, and actually, domestic saving fell. If foreign savings merely crowd
out domestic savings with no change in investment rates, the usefulness of foreign capital
for capital formation, a key factor in development, can be questioned. On the other hand,
if the inflows are in the form of FDI, particularly Greenfield investments as opposed to
M&A, foreign investment might have a more positive impact on physical capital
formation; yet, the effect might still be small due to the fact that on average FDI accounts
for only 3% of GDP (UNCTAD, 2007b). Nonetheless, FDI can still stimulate economic
activity by creating backward and forward linkages with the domestic economy.

2). Employment and Wages:
As previously mentioned, TTT are quite ambiguous in regards to the relationship
between trade and employment. This ambiguity results from the fact that TTT were not
concerned with the reallocation process of labor itself (i.e. the loss of jobs and the process
of finding a new one), as Jansen and Lee (2007) explained. Rather, this process was
assumed to take place instantaneously without any effect on employment. However,
29

during transition periods, trade liberalization can have significant effects on employment
if the economy is not characterized by full-employment, or if some domestic policy or
labor market failures hamper the adjustment process.

Moreover, although TTT

presumably do not allow for an effect on the “quantity” of jobs, they do imply an effect
on the “quality” of jobs, better or worse paid jobs, as a result of trade liberalization.38
Thus, in this context, it can be concluded that trade liberalization, and therefore
PTAs, do affect the level of employment as well as wages. Hence, if strategically
approached, PTAs have the potential to help DCs overcome the initial unemployment
problem and create better paid jobs when liberalizing trade. Of course, in order for this to
take place successfully, the economic integration process needs to be accompanied by a
coherent set of structural and social policies (Lee, 2005).
First, as already mentioned, PTAs can enlarge the size of a DC’s local markets.
This, in theory, could potentially allow the efficient exporting firms from DCs to expand
enough and absorb not only displaced labor resources, but also some of the initially idle
ones. Of course, the extent to which “efficient” firms take advantage of exporting
opportunities is subject to many other factors, such as supply capacity constraints.
Second, FDI projects in certain sectors, like call centers and other labor-intensive
activities, have the tangible effect of creating local employment without releasing any
employed labor. In addition, as mentioned before, FDI has the potential capacity to
increase commercial activity by creating linkages with the domestic economy. This can
potentially increase the demand for domestic labor by expanding domestic firms in order
to supply the newly established foreign firms (UNCTAD, 1999).
38

For further discussion, see for example, Jansen and Lee (2007); Lee (2005); and Ghose (2000).
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3). Technology Spillovers and Innovation:
Perhaps the most highly desired benefits that DCs seek from closer integrating
into the world economy are in the area of technology. TTT, like the H-O model, assume
similar technologies across borders; hence, it undermines the one main requirement for
growth and development as strongly affirmed by endogenous growth theories, which
largely base economic growth on technological change. Moreover, UNCTAD (1999)
reports that contrary to what neoclassical growth models postulate, technology is not a
free good that is available for use by producers everywhere because it cannot be traded
like a physical product. Instead, technology markets are opaque and often subject to
information failures.
In turn, new trade theories such as “learning economics” put forward mainly by
Westphal (1982), Stewart (1982), and Krugman (1984) have recognized the potentials of
international trade to help alleviate the backwardness of most DCs’ technological base
(Stewart, 1982). In essence, these theories argue that DCs can greatly benefit from
international trade by “learning” from the international-technology power house. This
can happen in several ways by increasing market access and foreign investment inflows.
First, international trade allows exposure to a greater variety of traded goods from
both imports and new domestic products developed to serve the enlarged market. This
increased variety of commodities embraces a great deal of embedded technology
(knowledge capital) that could be absorbed by utilization and/or reverse engineering.
Grossman and Helpman (1990; 1991) argue that benefits accrue in an industry and an
economy through “trade-knowledge”.

This trade-knowledge includes, and can be

modeled as, gains from foreign R&D embodied in traded goods, technology transfers
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through trade, process innovation, best practice implementation, and imported
intermediate goods of variety and quality. Note, however, that this requires an initial
minimal R&D base, strategic investment towards R&D efforts, and a minimal absorbing
capacity, human capital, something in which many DCs lag behind, as it will be
discussed in the next section (also see Deraniyagala and Fine, 2001).
Second, as Lall and Narula (2004) point out, TNCs continue to dominate the
creation of technology; indeed, with the rising costs and risks of innovation, their
importance has risen.

Hence, FDI inflows from TNCs can potentially generate

substantial “spillovers” not only of new technologies, but also of the technical know-how
to operate them. New established plants bring along new machinery and, perhaps, new
processes that allow for more efficient operation of existing domestic technologies.
Nonetheless, technology transfers from both increased trade commodities and FDI
projects can be hindered by the very PTA that has generated them, meaning that
burdensome IPR packages included in the PTA might well block any technology
transfers. This might have a greater impact in the case of N-S PTAs, which involves
large technology creators with usually stricter regulations that protect that technology.
Northern countries might carry on their domestic legislation on IPR to DCs when
forming a PTA hindering technology transfers (see Chapter IV).

4). Human Capital and Skill Enhancement:
The level of human capital that a country possesses is one of the few variables
empirically tested to have a determinant impact on the rate of economic growth.39
39

Miyamoto (2003, p. 44) lists several studies supporting this argument.
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Indeed, human capital accumulation is the other key factor of endogenous growth
theories, as mentioned before. Although it can only be mainly developed from within,
and although it is actually a prerequisite to benefit from economic integration (see next
section), it can also be enhanced by positive externalities when economic integration
takes place, thereby creating a prosperous cycle, as Miyamoto (2003) argues.
First, a larger market will generate increased productivity resulting from resource
allocation, but most importantly, from increased “specialization”. As Stewart (1992)
points out, Adam Smith demonstrated with his pin-production example that division of
labor enables specialization, which in turn pushes “repetition” of certain tasks, allowing
individuals to acquire higher levels of skill and learn new methods to produce
commodities more efficiently. But, as Adam Smith noted, such specialization is limited
by the extent of the market; the size of the market determines how much division of labor
and specialization is justified.
Secondly, and certainly more importantly, FDI from TNCs (mainly Greenfield
projects) is likely to introduce more sophisticated managerial practices and high-skilled
personal.

Local labor can greatly benefit from learning-by-doing, and imitation.

Moreover, a great part of FDI projects, especially in the manufacturing sectors, include
some sort of “training” for the employed local labor, increasing the general skill level and
technical know-how (UNCTAD, 1999).40 In addition, Miyamoto (2003) reports that
TNCs not only contribute to skill-enhancement of the local labor force, but they also
engage oftentimes in supporting formal education.

40

A report done by the World Bank, “World Business Environment Survey”, shows that approximately
60% of firms in both East Asia and Latin America regions conducted some formal training in the year 2000
(Batra and Tan, 2002; Batra, 2003, in Miyamoto, 2003, p. 19).
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2.2.3. From Theory to Practice
Theory is quite difficult to put into practice; hence, it is not to be assumed that
DCs will be able to materialize the abovementioned gains. As UNCTAD (2007b) notes,
an efficient development path requires more than mere “external integration”. This is
because benefiting from external development forces is strongly preconditioned by an
intensive “internal integration” process, which implies expanding domestic markets,
shifting patterns of employment, improving infrastructure, and creating a dense domestic
network of input-output linkages. By the same token, internal integration needs to be
supported by strong economic-socio-political institutions and proactive governments.

A). Absorbing Capacity: This characteristic will largely determine the realization
of potential dynamic gains that can be generated from FDI inflows. As briefly mentioned
before, there are different types of FDI and they all offer different positive externalities to
the host economy. However, this will be determined not only by the “quantity” of the
FDI attracted, but most importantly, by the “quality” of it.
For example, natural-resource-seeking FDI, which refers to projects of extraction
and processing of natural resources, has been traditional related to large amounts of
capital-intensive projects with little impact on the host economy as far as employment
and technology spillovers.41

Besides, they require some kind of natural resources

endowments in the host economy, which might not always be the case. On the other

41

Also, as stated by the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, the concentration on the production and export of
natural resources and raw materials, with time deteriorates the terms of trade for DCs. Partially, this is
because new technologies have replaced many natural raw resources with synthetic products, thereby
decreasing the world demand for the former (Appleyard and Field, 2001).
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hand, market-seeking and strategic-asset-seeking FDI42 might bring an array of benefits
impossible to obtain without such FDI, because these are internal to TNCs. For the
former, these include new technologies and/or new methods of operating existing ones,
international market networks, backward and forward linkages, established brand-names,
managerial know-how, and employment opportunities. The latter includes mostly R&D
increased capabilities. However, the attraction of these types of FDI usually requires
large domestic markets and certain high levels local capabilities (UNCTAD, 1999).
Efficiency-seeking FDI will be largely discussed in this research since it is the
type that historically has been most easily attracted by DCs. It mainly occurs when TNCs
locate part of their value-added production chain abroad in order to improve their
profitability. The oldest of such investments have been labor-seeking investments. As
wages rose in home countries, TNCs sought to obtain access to low-cost labor DCs by
locating in them the labor-intensive segments of their production processes. Attracting
this kind of FDI is usually easier for DCs, since they are characterized by a labor surplus
which makes it cheap and attractive to TNCs.
However, the benefits of this kind of FDI can be questioned because of its two
potential outcomes. On one side, it can bring several benefits, as UNCTAD (1999)
points out, the shifting of labor-intensive processes to DCs has probably been the most
important factor behind the growth of their manufactured exports in the past three
decades. Most importantly, this type of FDI is particularly attractive for its employment
creation feature by employing idle labor resources. On the other hand, the fact that this
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Market-seeking or “tariff-jumping” FDI basically relates to the establishment of foreign affiliates in the
host economy to expand their market share and increase their competitiveness from reduced transport and
tariff costs. Strategic-asset-seeking FDI mainly occurs in R&D areas (UNCTAD, 1999).
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FDI is mainly attracted by a static comparative advantage (cheap-labor), oftentimes
means that the benefits from it to DCs diminish or altogether vanish once the static
comparative advantage is exhausted (when wages rise).
To this end, it is needless to stress the role that a country’s capabilities play in
attracting FDI (quantity), but most importantly in the type of FDI that will be attracted
(quality) and the capacity to retain that investment. Lall and Narula (2004) point out that
absorptive capacity is significant for development because it allows domestic actors to
capture knowledge that exists elsewhere.

Where absorptive capacity is lacking in

domestic firms, they may, instead of reaping technological benefits from FDI, be
“crowded out”. Capabilities in the host country context matter for the magnitude and
intensity of technological updating. Lall and Narula (2004) further report that several
authors have noted that a minimum level of scientific and technical knowledge is
required to use innovation. Below this level, the cost of adoption can be prohibitive.43
Moreover, Saggi (2002) stresses the difference between technology “transfer” and
technology “diffusion”. This means that technology might be internationally transferred
through various channels, but will not necessarily be diffused throughout the rest of the
economy. Domestic actors play a critical role in this process, where the level of human
capital within the economy will largely determine its diffusion. In addition, as previously
mentioned, the process of technology diffusion can be hindered by the set of burdensome
IPR packages embraced in a certain PTA.

IPR regulation might well allow the

technology transfer to take place within the TNC and/or to certain enclave sectors, but the
diffusion to the rest of the economy might be restricted.
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Other studies reported in Lall and Narula (2004) present further empirical evidence of the need of a
minimum absorbing capacity in order for DCs to be able to absorb benefits from FDI.
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B). Supply Capacity Constraints: This characteristic will largely affect the
realization of dynamic gains that might result from an enlarged market simply because
the country is not able to respond to the increased demand (i.e. scale economies and
aggregate productivity, p.28-29). Most DCs lack important elements that constitute the
overall local producers’ capacity not only to initially respond to a larger demand, but also
to increase their existing potential. These elements include general infrastructure, such as
an extensive transportation network of roads and speedways, capable port infrastructure,
widespread communications networks, and reliable and efficient power and water
supplies that will initially enable producers to serve the enlarged market.44 Moreover,
accessible and well functioning credit markets are a determinant element since financing
is critical in both expansions and new start-ups.45

Also, labor mobility (efficient

transportation) needs to be improved, allowing displaced workers to more easily move to
exporting sectors where they might be needed.
If the abovementioned conditions are nonexistent or inefficient, the potential
benefits from economic integration become obsolete when enlarging the market. Supply
capacity constrains might even have negative effects, especially when entering a PTA
with a supply-capable partner (i.e. N-S PTA). In a N-S PTA, the DC might not be able to
respond to market access opportunities, but what is worse is that its domestic markets are
vulnerable to swamping by the northern country’s competitive and abundant products
(Fugazza and Vanzetti, 2006).

This might further press down weaker domestic

producers. On the other hand, in a S-S PTA there may be many missed opportunities due
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For a detailed discussion on adequate infrastructure and supply capacity as well as differences between
DCs and industrialized countries see for example, World Bank (2008b); and UNCTAD (2005).
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See World Bank (2008a); and UNCTAD (2005) for a detailed discussion on credit restraints in DCs.
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to supply capacity constraints, but at least there is no significantly superior supplycapable member to swamp the other members’ markets. Hence, it is important to stress
that if there are significant pre-existing production asymmetries among PTA members,
not only the weaker partner misses out of the opportunities, but also the stronger party
might get the lion’s share of the benefits (see Chapter III).

C). Government Intervention: The ultimate element in realizing dynamic and/or
static gains from economic integration (PTAs in this case), delivered by both market
access and foreign investment, is the proactive role that domestic governments play in the
entire odyssey.46 Making sure that an economy maximizes the benefits, or at least
diminishes the costs of all aspects of economic integration, is a job that cannot be done
by any theory, but only by local governments in interaction with their business
communities and social institutions. There are some areas in which a proactive role of
the government can be essential to benefit from full or partial economic integration.
First, before opting for across-the-board trade liberalization program hoping that it
will promote development, domestic governments need to a priori assess, and to
“design”, so to speak, the direction and form of trade liberalization that they need. This
requires extensive “economic” knowledge about their potentials and weaknesses and not
just “political” support. Eventually, this can give insights as to what sectors to liberalize,
under what terms, and whether the benefits will not be outweighed by the costs, thus,
designing beneficial liberalization schedules with enough built-in flexibility. Of course,
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Authors such as Hoekman (2005); Lall and Narula (2004); Lall (2000a), and reports such as UNCTAD
(1999, 2005, and 2007b) very much stress the important role that domestic governments should play in
realizing the benefits from economic integration.
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this is by no means an easy task, especially when negotiating N-S PTAs. Northern
countries are oftentimes not interested in a PTA with a DC mainly due to the low
incentives from a small market, unless advantageous concessions are offered, which
automatically results in a disadvantageous agreement for the DC. Hence, forming S-S
PTAs offers a “fairer” negotiating setup.

As I argue throughout this thesis, the

developmental benefits of PTAs are not only determined by theory, but largely by the
outcome of negotiations in designing them, where bargaining power is likely to have an
enormous real impact.
Second, trade theory has documented well that trade liberalization will result in
winners and losers. Hence, the government needs to identify those losers and be ready to
assist them in integrating into the reallocation process. This can be done by creating
realistic safety nets, such as unemployment assistance, training programs, and overall
increased investment in education, which ultimately will do both help individuals to be
able to allocate into the new enlarging sectors and increase the human capital stock to
better absorb the positive externalities that might come from the overall economic
integration process, but specifically from inward FDI.
Thirdly, there is just so much that the private sector can do in taking advantage of
new trade and investment opportunities and the benefits that come with them.

As

Hoekman (2005) stresses, governments should play a proactive role in interaction with
the business community by helping to regulate the financial sector, investing in
infrastructure projects, creating trade promoting agencies, and adopting overall follow-up
policies to adapt to the new atmosphere created by the “reallocation” process of
economic integration. This will ultimately increase the supply capacity of the private
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sector so that it can better respond to trade opportunities and more beneficially interact
with foreign investors. Moreover, one particular aspect in which the government can
directly stimulate this process is by not liberalizing in the government procurement area
and offering these projects exclusively to domestic suppliers, which can further stimulate
the overall domestic economic activity (see Chapter III for more detail).
Summing up, by constructing an alternative approach to traditional PTA analysis,
it has been shown that closer integrating economically (forming a PTA) can result in
various potential “dynamic” benefits for DCs. PTAs might be able to put at the doorstep
several of these benefits by enlarging the market, and potentially attracting FDI inflows.
However, there are two conditions if theory is to be put into practice: i) market access
needs to be actually exploited, which is not necessarily done by simply enlarging the
market on paper by signing a PTA, and ii) good quality foreign investments need to be
attracted, which is done by increasing local capabilities.

However, even if these

conditions are met, the ultimate developmental result from a certain PTA will only
depend on domestic absorbing and supply capacities to respond to trade and investment
opportunities and, on the proactive role of the government to shape the desired outcome.
With this being said, in the next two chapters, I will test this alternative approach
by analyzing the actual characteristics of two current PTAs, namely NAFTA and ASEAN
and its various trade and investment schemes, hoping to capture the developmental
benefits that Mexico and the ASEAN economies have been able to obtain from closer
integrating with their neighboring countries.
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CHAPTER III: MARKET ACCESS ISSUES IN NAFTA AND AFTA
In Chapter II, market access was identified as one of the two vehicles that can
potentially deliver substantial dynamic benefits to DCs from increased international
trade. Thus, improving access to the markets of partner countries is one of the key
motivations for DCs to pursue closer economic integration by forming a PTA.
Partially fueled by this line of thought, Mexico embarked on a mission of
obtaining preferential access to one of the world’s largest markets,47 which was right next
door, and kick-off its economic development process once-and-for-all by signing
NAFTA. Likewise, partially based on the same rationale, but with a more cautious
approach and with a likely smaller impact – given the market sizes – the ASEAN
economies formed a Free Trade Area (AFTA).48
However, after more than a decade from the creation of both agreements, the
development process of Mexico and that of the ASEAN-10 appears to have been
differently affected by each respective accord (see Chapter V). This despite the fact that
both agreements seem to have had a major impact on the export-flows of both Mexico
and the ASEAN-10 at the aggregate level (figures III.1 and III.2). On one hand, the
47

The US and Canada combined registered in 1995, a nominal GDP of US$7.88 trillion, or almost one
third of the world’s total GDP (UNCTAD, 2006a).
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AFTA was formed in January 1992, the six initial members were, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Vietnam joined AFTA upon its membership in ASEAN in 1995, Lao
PDR and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999 (for more information on this and other ASEAN
agreements go to: http://www.asean.org/4920.htm. The ASEAN-10 combined registered in 1995, a
nominal GDP of US$ 676 billion, or 2.2% of the world’s total GDP (UNCTAD, 2006a).
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increased export-flows in the case of Mexico do not seem to have delivered the economic
performance results that many expected; instead, the Mexican economy has been
performing worse than it did during some periods prior to NAFTA (see Chapter V). On
the other hand, the increased trading activity during the period of AFTA, especially in the
last years (figure III.2), seems to have been accompanied by an overall trend of
significantly positive economic performance by all members, before and during the
accord, compared to other similar DCs (see chapter V).

in US$Billions

Figure III.1. Mexico’s and the ASEAN-10 Total Export-Flows
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Figure III.2. Mexico’s and the ASEAN-10 Annual % Export Growth
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Assuming that, to a certain extent, both accords were responsible for the increased
export-flows experienced,49 and increased trade can be economically positive, the
somewhat paradoxical results from Mexico support the presumption at which I arrived in

49

In the case of NAFTA, many authors agree that it has been largely responsible for the export growth
experienced by Mexico after its implementation. For example, see Ramirez (2003) and Krueger (1999b), to
mention just a couple. In the case of AFTA, however, there are divided opinions. For example, Elliot and
Ikemoto, 2004 (in Lendle, 2007, p. 6) suggest that AFTA had no impact on intra-ASEAN trade. Other
studies, such as Cernat (2003) conclude that AFTA has positively influenced ASEAN’s overall trade flows.
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Chapter II: increased trade/export-flows created by the PTA do not necessarily imply
improved market access for the goods and services produced in the DC that can
positively influence its development. Rather, there must be many other factors and
circumstances that need to be put in place before and during the negotiating stage, if a
PTA is to generate greater market access and development. Otherwise, market access
opportunities offered by a PTA risk remaining only that – “opportunities”.
This chapter analyzes and compares crucial market access issues in both NAFTA
and AFTA. It also points out the main differences between them, pinning down some of
the reasons why they have delivered such different results, when the initial purpose was
to some extent based on the same rationale. In order to have a meaningful comparison,
the chapter is divided in three sections: i) the pre-existent circumstances in the run-up of
the accords’ negotiations, ii) the actual text-structure of each agreement regulating market
access, and iii) the final market access results generated in some of the most important
economic sectors for DCs such as, trade in manufactures, agriculture, and services.

3.1. Pre-Existent Circumstances
The general approach to improve market access is the elimination of tariffs, and
non-tariff barriers (NTB) to trade.

However, obtaining access to foreign markets,

especially for DCs, is a lot more complex than the mere reduction of tariffs and NTBs
(Chapter II, p. 24). A country’s economic, social and institutional structure might well
circumscribe the capacity to respond and capture any market access opportunities.
Hence, the pre-existent circumstances and potentials of each negotiating member as well,
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as the asymmetries among, them would likely have a decisive impact on both the final
text-structure of the accord and the actual results.

A). Bargaining Power: First and foremost, the level of bargaining power (in all
respects) brought to the negotiating table will definitely draw the direction that any PTA
will take, as far as drafting the actual text, which oftentimes could lead to a biased
agreement in favor of the stronger party. This issue had a stronger impact in the case of
NAFTA, where the economic muscle of the US and Canada was evident in several
political and economic areas such as: i) larger and better structured domestic markets, ii)
greater resources for the actual negotiating team, iii) more influential political and legal
frameworks that prevent trade negotiators from liberalizing beyond a certain point,50 and
iv) many and well organized lobbying groups. Due to these initial disadvantages, Mexico
might have been forced to undertake a broader and deeper liberalization of its markets in
order to obtain some preferential access to the US and Canada.51 In fact, this might have
well eroded a great part of the benefits obtained from the accord.
In AFTA, the problem of bargaining power was lesser, given the fact that at least
the five largest members were, and still are, at a similar stage of development and market
size.52

50

They had similar negotiating skills, similar economic resources, and similar

For example, the US Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002. See Khor (2007, p. 8).
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To better illustrate this point Panagariya (1998, p. 45) quotes Fred Bergsten (1997b, p. 26) as follows:
“NAFTA amounted to a 4% expansion of the American economy, to include a country that accepted
virtually every demand placed upon it in the negotiations and which made virtually all the concessions.”
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When NAFTA was negotiated the US economy was about 27 times larger than that of Mexico, US$7.3
trillion, and US$0.28 trillion respectively. These asymmetries were smaller in the case of AFTA,
especially among the five largest AFTA members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and
Thailand) (UNCTAD, 2006a).
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knowledge of their local markets. The weaker bargaining power aspect might have had
similar effects on the later AFTA joiners, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, and also
Brunei, the smallest economy; however, in AFTA, because it was a far less ambitious
accord, the impact of harmful concessions was lower for the late joiners of AFTA than
for Mexico under NAFTA.

B). Initial Tariff Levels: This pre-existing condition will likely have a negative
impact on most DCs from liberalizing trade, due to the relatively higher tariff levels.53 A
higher initial tariff rate implies a greater loss of revenue with two adverse effects. One,
the lost revenue will offset a great part of the country’s net welfare gains obtained; two, it
will further exacerbate the government’s financial ability to proactively assist its
development, (Chapter II, p. 38). This is because tariff revenue is a very important
source of the total government’s revenue of many DCs.54
For example, before NAFTA, Mexico applied on average an 11% tariff to its
future trade partners, compared to a 4% on average of the US and Canada to Mexico
(UNCTAD, 2007b).55 In the case of AFTA, with the exception of Singapore and Brunei,
all other founding members entered the accord with a substantially high tariff rate (table
III.1). However, it is also interesting to observe in table III.1 that the late AFTA comers
were permitted to further increase their tariffs for the first years and gradually decrease
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The average trade-weighted average applied tariff by DCs is 8.1%, compared to 2.9% of developed
countries (Fugazza and Vanzetti, 2006).
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For example, Lao-Araya (2002) reports that on average DCs collect 16.15% of their total revenue from
foreign taxes (tariffs), compared to about 0.89% in average in industrialized countries.

55

Panagariya (1998) reports that the redistributive effects of NAFTA due to its initial high tariff level
might be costing Mexico as much as US$3.25 billion per year.
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them later. This has made smoother the initial shock of lost revenue for the weaker
members, such as Cambodia that collected on average 58.1% of its total revenue from
tariffs (Lao-Araya, 2002).
Table III.1. Average Tariff Rate in the ASEAN-10 During AFTA

Source: Hapsari and Mangunsong (2006)

C). Consumption Patterns Differences: TTT predict that a reduction in tariffs
will increase market access and welfare gains from trade. However, as discussed in
Chapter II (p. 17), if markets are differentiated by income levels, the possibilities of
increasing market access (especially from low to high income markets) are largely
reduced. As Mayer and Zignago (2005, p. 1) argue, “while tariffs still have in general an
influence on trade patterns, our estimates suggest that they are not an important
component of market access difficulties faced by Southern exporters on Northern
markets”. Rather, complementary economies tend to trade more with one another despite
the level of tariffs applied.
Two observations are worth mentioning in regards to NAFTA and AFTA that
support this argument. Cuyvers and Pupphavesa (1996) report that AFTA has come
about from a long historical cooperation among its members through ASEAN, which
hardly generated any significant trade for the first 25 years or so. It was mainly due to
the members’ non-complementary economies. However, after years of attempting to
meet each others’ economic needs, intra-regional trade has been steadily increasing
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during the last decade (Figure III.1 and III.2), due not only possibly to AFTA, but also to
the gradual complementation of the members’ markets.
In the case of NAFTA, since the Mexican economy already heavily depended on
imports from the US before NAFTA,56 the US has greatly benefited from the accord.
The agreement only made it easier for US exporters to penetrate the Mexican market. On
the other hand, Mexico has only been successful in increasing its market access to the US
on the assembly line, or Maquiladora plants, as I will explore later in more detail. It
suffices for now to say that goods from the maquiladora sector can be hardly considered
“Mexican”, since most parts are imported from the US.57 Most other Mexican products,
excluding the oil sector, have performed quite poorly in penetrating the northern markets
of Canada and the US.

This was largely due to the lack of demand of Mexican

commodities in those markets.
Some Mexican exporters, mainly exporters in the consumer goods sectors, such as
typical and regional foods and clothing (i.e. consumer Mexican brands such as Corona,
Jumex, Marinela, and Bimbo), have increased their market share in the US market since
NAFTA (Salazar, 2004).

However, they have done so not by capturing American

consumers, but by serving the increasing demand generated from Mexican emigrants in
the US that have more than doubled in numbers since the accord took place.58 In other
words, these Mexican brands have been able to increase their sales to the very same
domestic consumers that did not have the purchasing power when in Mexico. Ironically,
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In 1990, Mexico imported 66.1% of total imports from the US (UNCTAD, 2006a).
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Calculations suggest that exported goods from the Maquiladora plants on average contain a mere 1-3% of
locally produced Mexican inputs (see Ramirez, 2003; and UNCTAD, 2007b).

58

Delgado-Wise (2004, p. 594) reports that since NAFTA the migratory flow over the past decade has
been 10 times higher than the one recorded 20 years earlier.

47

Mexico had to enter NAFTA to generate an emigration wave and expand market access
for wholly produced Mexican goods in the US, but American brands such as Coca-Cola,
Frito-Lay, and even Taco-Bell had long before NAFTA captured the Mexican market.

D). Supply Capacity Constraints: In Chapter II (p. 36), it was concluded that a
pre-condition in the capturing of opportunities of an enlarged market was the “readiness”
of a country to do so. This readiness was composed of the physical infrastructure and
credit markets available to local producers to respond to the new demand. However, it
was also concluded that the average DC, including Mexico and the ASEAN-10, is less
equipped with adequate infrastructure and credit markets than industrialized countries.59
In the case of NAFTA, Mexican exporters were faced with US and Canadian exporters
equipped with widespread and abundant transportation resources and sophisticated
communications networks. Most importantly, US and Canadian exporters had at their
disposal not only domestic strong credit markets, but also, oftentimes, access to
international credit markets. Under these circumstances, Mexico might not only have lost
many trade opportunities, but even worse it might have exposed its domestic markets to
be swamped by US and Canadian products, further pressing down weak domestic
producers (Chapter II, p. 37).
In the case of AFTA, there were many missed out trade opportunities by all
members, but at least, there was no evident supply-capable member that was able to
59

For example, the US has about 0.67 thousand sq/km of roads and speedways per sq/km of surface
compared to 0.18 of Mexico. On average high-income countries have 660 vehicles (both commercial and
private) per 1000 inhabitants, compared to about 250 on average in DCs. 65% of firms from DCs reported
infrastructure inefficiency as one of the main obstacles to operate. High-income countries have on average
55 telephone lines per 100 inhabitants, as opposed to 13 on average in DCs. In DCs, on average, 45% of
firms reported credit access problems as opposed to only 17% in most industrialized countries (World Bank
Statistics in Infrastructure at: http://www.worldbank.org/ ). See also Jansen and Lee (2007).
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swamp the other members’ markets. Singapore is the only member that might have been
superior as far as adequate infrastructure and credit markets, but given the small size of
its economy, it is highly unlikely that it could have an impact such as the one of the US
on Mexican markets.

3.2. The Texts Governing Market Access
Large asymmetries in all the abovementioned pre-existing circumstances among
members of a future PTA will definitely generate different sets of rules and regulations
governing market access opportunities, which ultimately will determine any
developmental gains that each member will obtain. This has certainly been the case for
NAFTA and AFTA which, although set out to accomplish similar goals, delivered
somewhat different final results.

Hence, it is important to analyze the main

characteristics that each agreement embraces as far as market access and to point out the
main differences that might have led to the different results.
According to Estevadeordal (1999), there are two basic parts of any market access
agreement that will dictate and regulate trade among members: i) the preferential tariff
level to be set and the phase-out schedule (Liberalization Schedule), and ii) the governing
RoO that will evaluate if a commodity is generated within the borders of a member. In
addition, there are some other important features that characterize most PTAs today,
which will also have an impact on the final results of the agreement. These include the
concept of reciprocity, government procurement, and the built-in flexibility that the
accord offers to the weaker partner to gradually adapt to the initial shock. All these will
be discussed in turn below.
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3.2.1. Liberalization Schedules
Estevadeordal (1999) explains that, traditionally, the tariff level in PTAs used to
be set at a fixed preferential level below the MFN rate. But the constant unilateral and
multilateral tariff reductions had the effect of progressively eroding preference margins
initially agreed upon. Hence, to maintain those margins over time, countries needed to
constantly renegotiate the agreement (an issue that AFTA members are currently facing
as discussed below).

Later on, PTAs were based on constant relative margins of

preference by negotiating preferential tariff reductions as a percentage of the MFN
currently applied rates. In fact, most current PTAs have followed the NAFTA model in
many respects, moving towards tariff phase-out programs that are relatively quick,
automatic, and nearly universal. The tariff elimination process follows pre-specified
timetables ranging from immediate elimination to up to generally 10 years period phaseouts, with special phase-out periods for those products regarded as “sensitive”. These are
very important features of a PTA, for they permit or hinder, in the short-run, the weaker
partner to adapt to an initial greater drop of tariff revenue and to increase its
competitiveness in all the weak sectors before the phase-out period ends.
In the case of NAFTA, half of its 22 chapters60 regulate and specifically address
in detail the list of items covered by the agreed tariff rate and when, if included in the
accord, it applies. Also in the case of NAFTA, the set tariff rate was straightforward and
members agreed on a zero tariff rate starting from their respective pre-NAFTA MFN
applied tariff levels. The elaborated part of the agreement was the phase-out schedule
under which parties agreed to phase-out their respective tariffs for the initially excluded
60

For a full copy of the NAFTA Text, go to: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/naftatce.asp
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sensitive items. The parties agreed to put goods into several categories depending on
their sensitivity to import competition, reflecting the magnitude of liberalization effect as
well as the political weight of each sector. The four main NAFTA stages specifying the
number of equal-size annual cuts until full liberalization were: A (immediate), B (five
stages), C ten stages, C+ (fifteen stages).61 At the time of implementation on January 1st,
1994 tariffs for about half of all import categories were eliminated immediately, and most
of the remaining tariffs were set to disappear within a period of five years. The most
drastic phase-out was carried out by Mexico with initial cuts above 50% on average. The
US, which had started with low tariffs, implemented an almost immediate full tariff
liberalization, with the exception of specific sensitive sectors, such as food products,
textiles, apparel, and footwear manufactures (Estevadeordal, 1999).
In comparison, the main instrument that regulates market access in AFTA is the
Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT). The preferential tariffs rate agreed by
AFTA members was ambiguously set to 0-5%. The initial phase-out program was set to
15 years, but later moved up to 10 years for all members according to the date of
accession of the CEPT program.62

In a fashion like NAFTA, the CEPT phase-out

program was also divided in product categories, allowing gradual liberalization.
However, even in the CEPT inclusion product list there was much less immediate
liberalization of goods. There are two phase-out routes for the CEPT inclusion list that
allow members to immediately liberalize products under the “Fast-Track” or instead to
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Quote from Estevadeordal (1999, p. 6): “It is interesting to note that it was the United States that insisted
on C+ category. This embarrassed the US Chief negotiator who later said “it was as if we were the
developing country,” reported in Mayer (1999 p. 117).”
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Vietnam in 1995, Lao and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.
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spread out the liberalization process through the initial phase-out schedule of 10 years
under the “Normal-Track”. There are three other additional liberalizing categories that
allow for sensitive products to be excluded from the CEPT program: i) temporary
exclusions list, which will gradually be reduced by 20%, annually moving these items to
the general inclusion list over a five years period, ii) sensitive agricultural products,
which will be extended with a deadline of the year 2010 for their integration into the
CEPT, and iii) general exceptions, which are permanently excluded from liberalization
(Cuyvers and Pupphavesa, 1999).
There are some important differences in regards to the preferential tariff and the
phase-out schedules that NAFTA and AFTA have pursued and that would have generated
the eventual outcomes on market access. First, the preferential tariff level in NAFTA
was immediately dropped to zero for a great part of the product groups included in the
scheme. This has, without a doubt, had a tremendous initial impact on Mexico, not only
decreasing the tariff revenue, but also taking the risk of having liberalized too much too
soon.63 In AFTA, the preferential tariff rate was set to 0-5%, not absolute zero. On one
hand, this issue has drawn some negative attention from observers such as Hapsari and
Mangunsong (2006), who argue that tariffs under the CEPT have been underutilized
since the weighted preferential tariffs in AFTA were higher than MFN tariffs. On the
other hand, it reflects the much relaxed impact of the initial tariff reduction.64 Second,
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Froot (1989) empirically demonstrates that: “A gradual lowering of trade barriers turns out to be welfaresuperior to an immediate liberalization”. Also, see Jansen and Lee (2007) for more detail.
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Note that several authors such as Naya and Imada, 1992, Alburo, 1994, Pangestu, 1994, and Chia, 1994
(in Cuyvers and Pupphavesa, 1996, p. 10) argue that the transition period in AFTA is too long, and it has to
be speeded up. Moreover, Baldwin, 2006 (in Lendle, 2007, p. 9) presents empirical evidence on tariff
underutilization in AFTA.
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the general phase-out program was set out almost identically, but the range of products
included was much larger in NAFTA than in AFTA,65 and the broader the liberalization,
the riskier it can be for the DC, because some weak, yet fundamental sectors might need
initial protection to not be crowded out by the foreign stronger competition. Therefore,
the AFTA more cautious approach to this issue can allow more flexibility to select the
sectors ready for liberalization.

3.2.2. Rules of Origin
Because of their discriminatory nature, PTAs must distinguish non-memberoriginating from member-originating products in order for a product to be granted
preferential access.

There are two main features of RoO that would likely play a

detrimental role in the level of market access obtained by DCs from a PTA: i) they are
costly and complex to comply with, and ii) according to an increasing literature in many
PTAs the RoO adopted are protectionist and discriminatory (see below).
First, given the fact that a large part of exporters from DCs are Small-MediumEnterprises (SMEs), the general restructuring costs generated by trade liberalization can
be considerably large, and oftentimes these costs go beyond their capacities. In addition
to that, in order for exporters of DCs to take full advantage of the new export
opportunities, sometimes they have to totally redesign their administrative practices to
produce the required documentation to comply with the complex RoO. Large exporters
might be able to internally adopt and implement new software and accounting systems,
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In fact, as Shimizu (2007, p. 76) points out, “the efficacy of AFTA could not be overestimated”.
Because, large important sectors were excluded from liberalization, and the regional trade applied by
AFTA and the CEPT was extremely small.
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but smaller exporters usually have to outsource the exporting practices (Stiglitz and
Charlton, 2005). In both cases, the cost can well offset a great part of the benefits
obtained from the preferential tariff rate because the total administrative costs imposed by
the RoO are high due to the obligation of certifications almost always involving both
public and private spheres.66
Secondly, and most importantly, RoO have been identified by many authors to
embrace hidden protectionism.67 RoO, restrictive beyond a certain point in a PTA, have
two negative effects: i) they potentially invite members to indirectly protect certain weak
domestic industries from direct competition from the partner’s more efficient firms, and
ii) they have been found to have trade diverting effects in many potentially trade creating
sectors, which is welfare decreasing from a Viner’s perspective (Chapter II, p. 19).
NAFTA is composed of the largest and most restrictive set of RoO today, which,
according to many authors, including Hufbauer and Schott (2005), Estevadeordal (1999),
Panagariya (1998), Ramirez (2003), Kume et. al. (2006), and Cadot et. al. (2005) are
protectionist, trade diverting, and far beyond the necessary in a PTA. Indeed, they have
been identified as one of the main causes for the insignificant market access that Mexico
has obtained from NAFTA in some of its most competitive manufacturing sectors, like
textiles and apparel (see next section).
In contrast, the RoO embraced in AFTA have not been very controversial because
they are quite simple and straightforward and based mainly on a regional value content
(RVC), which has been set at 40% according to the “ASEAN content requirement”
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Some rough estimates suggest that costs of documentation of origin requirements vary between 1.4% and
5.4% of the export value (Kume et al., 2006).
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See for example, Krishna and Kruger, 1995 (in Estevadeordal, 1999, p. 6).
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(CEPT, art. 2.4)68 without any additional regulations (Cuyvers and Pupphavesa, 1996).
ASEAN origin can be simply obtained and enjoy preferential treatment among the
members if 40% of the value of a product originated in ASEAN countries and the product
is included in the CEPT list. Cuyvers and Pupphavesa (1996) point out that some critics
argue that AFTA’s RoO are not in accord with international standards, which might
enable abuses and lead to confusing situations. Mainly, there are concerns that third
countries might penetrate the regional market using the free-tariff ports of Singapore and
Brunei enjoying preferential access to the rest of the area. However, it has not been a
topic of much concern since some evidence has discharged such fears (ibid).
There are two concrete differences between the RoO in NAFTA and AFTA that
have impacted Mexico and the ASEAN-10 differently. First, the simplicity of complying
with AFTA’s RoO in comparison to NAFTA’s might have been less burdensome for
AFTA members, allowing them to net larger gains from trade. Second, the lost market
access opportunities for AFTA members were likely less than they were for Mexico, due
to the restrictive and protectionist RoO in NAFTA.

3.2.3. Other Features
In addition to the two abovementioned characteristics regulating market access in
PTAs, there are some other important features that will directly influence a PTA’s final
developmental impact and that are certainly related to the market access issues discussed
in this chapter. These include reciprocity, government procurement liberalization, and
the built-in flexibility embraced in the accord favoring the weaker members.
68

For text copies of RoO and RVC regulation in ASEAN, go to: http://www.aseansec.org/17281.htm .
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First, in order to comply with the GATT Art. XXIV, most PTAs today embrace
the concept of reciprocity. However, as Stiglitz and Charlton (2005) recall, PTAs could
be relatively more development-friendly if some advantages are provided to the weaker
members on “non-reciprocal” basis, especially in PTAs where there are large
asymmetries among members (N-S PTAs). For example, if NAFTA were to intrinsically
embrace any development drive, it would have been designed differently. As UNCTAD
(2007b) points out, Mexico was expected, or forced, to perform from a much less
advantageous position on a reciprocal basis with the US and Canada. On the other hand,
AFTA is also based on reciprocity, but given the similar stage of development among
members, this would likely have had a smaller impact for any individual member.
Besides, smaller AFTA members were given more freedom and flexibility to adopt as
opposed to the larger initial members (i.e. tariffs, p. 45).
Secondly, one particular aspect of market access in current PTAs is the inclusion
of government procurement into the liberalization schedule.

This, as Stiglitz and

Charlton (2005) report, can have serious development implications given the fact that this
sector in DCs on average accounts for as much as 20% of their GDP. Hence, offering
this demand to local producers can be a significant policy tool that favors weak domestic
producers and achieves a better balance in the economic weight of various social groups
and communities within the nation. On the contrary, if this area is liberalized, the
government gives up very important policy space to pursue its development goals, as was
the case when Mexico signed NAFTA in which is included the liberalization of this area.
In contrast, AFTA does not include the liberalization of this area. Of course, one
could argue that Mexican firms have the possibility to bid in US and Canada tender
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markets, which are much larger than that of Mexico. However, as UNCTAD (2007b)
explains, it is very unlikely that a net benefit from market access for government
procurement will accrue for Mexico, because most Mexican producers lack the supply
capacity needed for the types of goods and services provided under an average
government contract.69 There is a very important point that needs to be made here.
Although market access can be granted in paper by signing a PTA, it is not to be assumed
that such market access will be actually exploited by the DC.
Thirdly, one of the most crucial and evident differences between NAFTA and
AFTA, not only in regards to market access, but in all the areas covered in the
agreements, is the built-in flexibility that AFTA has had since its formation compared
with that of NAFTA. On the one hand, the signing of NAFTA arose in a sudden and
rushed decision by the Mexican government as it became convinced that profound
integration into the world economy was the only ticket to national development and that
the US was the ideal, if not the only, partner to achieve this. Hence, Mexico sought to
“lock-in” trade preferences and economic reforms by committing itself to NAFTA. But
as Panagariya (1998, p. 22) points out, “if these preferences were harmful to Mexico in
the first place, the lock is not a benefit but a cost”. Moreover, as UNCTAD (2007b)
points out, NAFTA was never set out to eventually further “integrate”, and it might be
extremely hard to be renegotiated, at least in favor of Mexican development needs.
On the other hand, AFTA comes from, at least, a longer political cooperation
between members. The first attempt to form a PTA was done in 1977. This was
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Data from the US Federal Procurement Data System (USFPDS, 2007) reported in UNCTAD (2007b, p.
60) reports that, in 2005, 94% of payments made by the Federal Government went to companies located in
the US, leaving only 6% to all suppliers from the rest of the world.
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eventually replaced with AFTA.

Cuyvers and Pupphavesa (1996) list many other

initiatives by the AFTA members in their attempts to understand and shape each others’
economic needs. These include, the Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Projects
(AIP), the Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC), and the
Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (AIJV). These agreements mostly
failed or were dismissed to make way for AFTA and the CEPT, but the experience
obtained was invaluable. Moreover, AFTA itself has been revisited and revised many
times according to the changing needs of the members. The phase-out periods have been
pushed forward, more products have been added for liberalization, and at the same time,
many countries have fallen behind the initial commitments due national development
needs. In addition, unlike NAFTA, ASEAN/AFTA has ambitions to further “integrate”
and become ultimately an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC).70

3.3. Actual Market Access Outcomes
The previous two sections analyzed how certain pre-existent circumstances might
a priori determine the level of market access that DCs might obtain from a PTA and the
actual accord’s text that those conditions generated in the case of NAFTA and AFTA. In
this section, I will present some of the actual outcomes that NAFTA and AFTA have
delivered to Mexico and the ASEAN-10 respectively in regards to market access during
the lifetime of the agreements.
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As stated on the “Declaration of ASEAN Concord II”, an ASEAN Economic Community is the
realization of the end-goal of economic integration as outlined on the ASEAN Vision 2020 to create a
stable, prosperous, and highly competitive ASEAN economic region in which there is a free flow of goods,
services, investments, and a freer flow of capital, equitable economic development, and reduced poverty
and socioeconomic disparities by the year 2020 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2003). See Shimizu (2007) for a
more detailed discussion of the integration evolvements in ASEAN.
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As mentioned, development is the main objective for DCs in their pursuit of a
certain PTA, development that is to make existing sectors more competitive, to acquire
new endowments, and to improve employment opportunities and living standards. This
can be obtained by expanding the market for their competitive sectors and absorbing and
implementing new technologies and production practices during the integration process.
However, given their initial capabilities, this process implies the initial concentration on
unskilled-labor-intensive sectors such as, low-technology-manufactures, agriculture, and
labor-intensive services. Eventually, these sectors should be upgraded and new industries
developed as proof of progressive development. Otherwise, the development drive of a
PTA might be questioned.

3.3.1. Market Access in Manufactures
Historically, almost the entire manufacturing sector has been controlled by
industrialized countries; however, the world market share for DCs has been steadily and
rapidly increasing,71 which reflects the importance of these sectors for DCs as well as the
necessity to further increase market access in this area.
As shown in figures III.1 and III.2, Mexico’s total export-flows have increased
since NAFTA took effect, especially to the US, which went from 62% of total exports
during the ‘80s to 86% during the five-year period between 2001-2006 (UNCTAD,
2007b, p.70). Although increased export-flows are an economic positive according to
trade theory, it is also important to note that NAFTA has only increased Mexico’s
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According to UNCTAD (2006a), the world’s share of exported manufactured goods for DCs has changed
from 24.3% in 1995 to 35.1% in 2005.
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dependency on US markets, and hence, its economic performance to become largely
subject to the rules of NAFTA (Ramirez, 2003). A great part of this increase occurred in
manufactures such as textiles and apparel, automobiles and automobile parts, and
electrical and electronic goods. The share of these manufactures in total exports went
from around 30% in the early ‘80s to around 80% in 2006 (UNCTAD, 2007b).
Nonetheless, as previously mentioned, increased export/trade-flows do not necessarily
imply improved market access for the sectors that can positively influence the economic
development of the DC, as I will discuss below.
In regards to the textile and apparel industries, the restrictive RoO in NAFTA
came to play a crucial role on the final market access that Mexico would have obtained
from these sectors.

Due to the fact that these industries are considered extremely

“sensitive” for the US, the American textile industry pursued a curious and successful
strategy regarding its survival by introducing the “yarn-forward-rule” in NAFTA, as
reported by Destler (in Kume et. al., 2006, p. 10), which forced Mexican producers to
source raw materials from US producers. The textile and apparel sectors in NAFTA have
been identified by some authors (Estevadeordal, 1999, and Kume et. al., 2006) as having
the most restrictive RoO in NAFTA. These sectors, which had a large potential to
generate trade creation due to the high level of protection from all parties, ultimately
ended up being one of the few industries in which NAFTA has fostered trade diversion.
Cadot et. al. (2005) have empirically estimated that the apparent market access
obtained by Mexico in these sectors has, in reality, been largely offset by the costs
incurred by Mexican producers in adjusting to the new sourcing rules implemented by
NAFTA. Hence, although trade flows increased in these industries, not only did Mexico
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hardly obtain any potential dynamic development benefits from these trade flows, but it
might even netted welfare losses due to trade diversion.
The impressive performance of the automotive sectors is oftentimes referred to as
novel proof of NAFTA’s success for Mexico. However, there are two main issues that
have potentially offset said benefits for Mexico. First, in NAFTA, the auto sectors have
the highest RVC, set at 62.5%, which has highly reduced the possibilities of Mexican
manufactures to source from cheaper suppliers. This again generates trade diversion
(Kume et. al. 2006). Secondly, the automotive industry in Mexico is mostly concentrated
on the assembly-line process, or the so-called maquiladora programs, which represent on
average 45% of the total Mexican exports and 52% of manufactured exports, out of
which 20% are from the auto industry. However, maquiladora industries are confined to
labor-intensive assembly type activities with mere 3% domestic inputs. Although their
contribution to Mexican GDP and employment has grown from 2% and 1.4% in 1993 to
6% and 3.4% in 1999, they remain a highly disarticulated sector from the rest of the
economy and highly dependant and susceptible to the dynamism of industrial production
in the US (Ramirez, 2003).72
Such enclave sectors automatically reduce the developmental impact of some
potential dynamic gains from economic integration (Chapter II, p. 28). For example,
backward and forward linkages with domestic producers, which in turn could increase
economic activity and employment.

While technology transfers might take place

“within” the sector, its diffusion to the rest of the economy is prohibited (Saggi, 2002).
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As mentioned by Delgado-Wise (2004), Mexico’s export “miracle” can be largely explained by
globalization strategies drawn up in Detroit – the U.S. auto industry accounted for approximately one out of
every five dollars of Mexico’s non-oil exports during 1997.
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In a fashion like NAFTA, AFTA has also significantly increased intra and extra
export/trade-flows (figures III.1 and III.2). However, unlike Mexico that is heavily
dependant on US markets, most AFTA countries, with the exception of Laos and
Myanmar,73 have a much more diversified export-destination-structure (figure III.3).
This significantly reduces the dependency on only one external market and, hence, the
risks of external economic slowdowns.
Figure III.3: Major Markets of ASEAN’s Exports, 2004
ASEAN
25%

Japan
12%

EU
11%

Others
21%

USA
9%
Aus tralia
3%

Taiwan
3%

South Korea
4%

Hong Kong
5%

China
7%

Source: ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Statistical Yearbook (2005).

Like Mexico, one of the most dynamic export sectors for AFTA members is
manufacturing, which all together account for 57% of total exports (ASEAN Secretariat,
2005). But unlike Mexican manufactures that contained a mere 1-3% of local inputs,
manufactures from the AFTA area on average employ up to 33% of local inputs
(UNCTAD, 2006d, p. 187). The sharp increase of intra-regional trade in these areas is
mainly due to the successful implementation of the CEPT scheme, which included all
manufacturing products in its liberalization schedules.

Currently, about 81% of

ASEAN’s tariff lines are in the inclusion list of the CEPT, a great part of which are
manufactures. AFTA has made it possible to increase trade flows for many reasons, but

73

Myanmar and Laos destine about 80% of their exports to the AFTA area (ASEAN Secretariat, 2006).
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certainly a clear reason is the fact that intra-AFTA tariff rates have dropped from 12.76%
in 1993 to approximately 2.7% in 2003 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2006).
Proportionally, AFTA has generated less export/trade-flows than NAFTA did for
Mexico. However, these exports appear to have had a generally overall positive impact
on all members, simply because the rules of the game were different and more favorable
in AFTA than in NAFTA. There are three main differences worth mentioning that might
shed some light on this statement.
First, RoO were by far more relaxed in AFTA than in NAFTA, allowing members
not only to spend less to comply with them, but also to actually obtain some market
access to each other’s markets. Secondly, although AFTA trade flows are concentrated
in very specific sectors, they are not as evidently concentrated on the same geographical
region as the maquiladora plants in northern Mexico, which has created a dual economy
in Mexico, the domestic and the export economy. Thirdly, AFTA has much more built-in
flexibility than NAFTA, a very important feature especially for DCs. For example, in
AFTA, countries were free to choose what goods to include and when to liberalize them
throughout the ten-year period. Mexico had this option for very few sectors. AFTA also
includes a “Temporary Exclusion List”, which allows members to temporally exclude
strategic industries from liberalization even if they were initially included.

This is

permissible under a Protocol Regarding the implementation of the CEPT Scheme
Temporary Exclusion List.

Malaysia invoked this protocol in 2000, delaying tariff

reductions on completely-built-up automobiles, and automobile knock-out kits, in order
to protect its local auto industry (US-ASEAN Business Council, 2008). NAFTA has
nothing similar to this protocol in its market access clauses.
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3.3.2. Market Access in Agriculture
Liberalizing the agricultural sector in DCs can be a very tricky maneuver because
on one hand, it is important to expand markets for domestic producers, but on the other
hand, local consumers could potentially face extremely high prices due to the inefficient
domestic markets. Agricultural reforms, especially in regards to trade liberalization, must
proceed carefully, for agriculture represents a very important part of both national
development and daily livelihoods in most DCs. The agricultural sector in many DCs
represents almost 40% of their GDP, 35% of their total exports, and most importantly,
over half of their total employment (Stiglitz and Charlton, 2005) (figure III.4).
Figure III.4: Employment in the Agricultural Sector
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Developed and Developing Countries
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Source: Author’s calculations from UNCTAD (2006a).

Therefore, DCs with such a high level of dependency in this sector can not afford
to opt to offer lower prices to domestic consumers, who mostly live in better off urban
areas, at the expense of the large rural population that depends on the local agriculture for
survival. It is especially because the low level of support that DCs can offer the sector to
increase its production efficiency and capacity to compete internationally.74 Moreover, it
has to be considered the inefficient labor mobility and nonexistent safety nets that most
DCs offer displaced workers (Chapter II, p. 16/37).
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For example, Arroyo Picard et. al. (2003) report that in average industrialized countries spent in 1998
between US$15, 000 to US$20,000 per full-time farmer, as opposed to around US$1,000 in the few DCs
that do provide agriculture assistance.
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Needless to say, Mexico opted for lower consumer prices in agricultural products
with the potential displacement of nearly 8 million farmers, approximately 22% of the
economically active population, that depended on the agricultural sector for mere survival
before NAFTA (Ramirez, 2003).

This is perhaps the most evident and politically

sensitive outcome of NAFTA, the near extermination of the agricultural sector in Mexico
due to the tremendous import-wave of highly-subsidized agricultural products from the
US after NAFTA’s implementation.75
The well-known large support of US farmers was expected to have this impact
against the merely subsistence farmers in Mexico. Thus, some necessary measures were
taken in NAFTA in order to help Mexico to adjust its agrarian economy, allowing a 15
years phase-out period for most of the agricultural sector. However, as reported by
Ramirez (2003), 30 months within the accord, the Mexican government decided to
liberalize the entire sector and stop any financial support. As a result, imports of corn
from the US more than tripled and other commodities such as soybean, wheat, poultry,
and beef rose by over 500%, thereby displacing local production. The prices of these
commodities dropped in Mexico by about 48% and more than 2 million farmers were
displaced and forced to migrate to urban areas or to the US (ibid). In short, recalling
Chapter II, by liberalizing agriculture, Mexico has sent the sector from low-productivity
to zero productivity – unemployment of farmers.
In contrast, with the exception of Singapore and Brunei, most of the AFTA
members also share some of the characteristic of Mexico in the agricultural, such as high
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In some accounts US subsidies amount to 37% of the value of total agricultural output (United States
Congressional Budget Office, 2006) (reported in UNCTAD, 2007b, p. 68).
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export dependency and high employment in the sector.76 However, there are two crucial
differences that are worth mentioning between NAFTA and AFTA that have likely
produced the devastating results for Mexico but almost insignificant results on the
agricultural sectors of the AFTA members: 1) there are no members in AFTA that have
nearly as highly subsidized agricultural sectors as the US does, so the production
efficiency and prices were similar in all the members, and 2) AFTA did not liberalize the
agricultural sectors nearly as much as Mexico did in NAFTA. Cuyvers and Pupphavesa
(1996) report that, initially, only processed agricultural products were included in CEPT
schedule, which broaden the scope years later to further liberalize other agricultural
products. Moreover, the CEPT reserves a “Sensitive Agricultural Products List” that
allows for strategically sensitive products to be excluded indefinitely, if the country
chooses to do so. It seems evident that AFTA members opted for the protection of the
rural population, which depended on agriculture for survival, rather than securing low
prices for the better off urban population as it was the case of Mexico under NAFTA.

3.3.3. Market Access in Services
Although the world’s share of DCs in services trade has steadily increased during
the last fifteen years, it is still a sector largely governed by developed countries.77
Services are oftentimes a large part of DCs’ total GDP. Therefore, increasing market
access for these sectors can be very important for development. Moreover, Brown,
Deardorff and Stern (in Stiglitz and Charlton, 2005, p. 52) stress the fact that, since
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On average the ASEAN-10 employ 48.1% of their population in agriculture (ASEAN Secretariat, 2006).
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DCs world’s share in traded services has gone from 18% in 1990 to 24% in 2006 (UNCTAD, 2006a).
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barriers are typically higher in the service sectors, welfare gains from further world
and/or regional liberalization could deliver much larger gains than liberalization in both
agriculture and manufacturing.
However, both NAFTA and AFTA are reciprocal agreements, which means that
equal concessions have to be given to the trading partners. As Khor (2007) stresses, it is
crucial to have a tactical national service plan to understand what services to liberalize,
and which not to liberalize, if the sector is to have an overall positive impact. Moreover,
as discuss in Chapter II (p. 36) and reported by UNCTAD reports (in Khor, 2007), many
DCs lack the supply capacity to respond to service trade opportunities, such as capable
human resources, adequate technology, wide telecommunications networks, and overall
government support for service firms. Furthermore, UNCTAD notes that DCs, trying to
export services to developed countries, face difficult barriers such as lack of
commitments on movement of natural persons, due among others reasons, to strict and
discretionary visa and licensing requirements and the recognition of qualifications.
Evaluating the impact of services liberalization is more complex than evaluating
market access for goods because services trade data are less comprehensive than those of
merchandise. A comprehensive discussion on what impact improved market access in
services could potentially have on development is beyond the scope of this research.
Rather, I will focus on exploring some of the most crucial clauses and liberalization
processes that have occurred in NAFTA and AFTA. Specifically, I will point out some
of the main differences between both accords and the likely impact that their design
might have on spurring or hindering the development process of the DCs involved.
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Hufbauer and Schott (2005)78 point out that the general impact of trade in services
in NAFTA was noticeably smaller than merchandise trade flows for the three members,
not only for Mexico. But thanks to one peculiar clause embraced in NAFTA, the small
trade in services that took place has permanently harmed Mexico’s domestic economy.
NAFTA, like many other US accords, takes the “negative-list-approach” (Chapter IV, p.
75) to services liberalization, which means that all services are included in the
liberalization, except the ones that are specifically excluded. Also, UNCTAD (2007b)
recalls that there is no possible backtrack.
In NAFTA, there are three evident samples of miscalculations of Mexico’s service
liberalization that have had a permanent negative impact. One was a miscalculation from
the Mexican negotiators. Another was a flat out violation by the US. The final one
should have been included, but it was not.
NAFTA includes provisions for the liberalization of financial services.79
Hufbauer and Schott (2005) report that, initially, Mexico had negotiated a long phase-in
period, but chose to accelerate the pace of liberalization on the wake of the peso crisis.
This resulted in an almost complete take over of the domestic banking sector by foreign
banks, which might control the sector according to their own interests and not in favor of
Mexico’s development priorities. The foreign share of Mexican banking assets has
increased from 1% in 1994 to 90% in 2001. The main consequence of this financial
transformation is a drastic reduction of “connected-lending” motivated by political and
family relations rather than by sound commercial principles (ibid).
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Also see, Sen, 2003 (in Lesher and Miroudot, 2005, p. 331).

79

Chapter Fourteen of the NAFTA text: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/naftatce.asp
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Once again, as already mentioned in Chapter II (p. 36), one of the main problems
as to why DCs do not fully exploit the market access opportunities that PTAs offer is the
supply capacity constraints that they face. The supply of adequate transportation services
is a big step forward in overcoming some of these constraints. NAFTA was intended to
gradually allow Mexican trucks to operate in the entire US territory, and vice versa. This
would have played a tremendous role on the supply capacity of Mexican producers by
enabling them to serve the new enlarged market. Indeed, political foot-dragging and
judicial challenges indefinitely delayed the implementation of this provision. In fact, up
to date the issue is still pending (Hufbauer and Schott, 2005).
The immigration issue between Mexico and the US has a long history before
NAFTA. Mexico’s scarce social safety nets are not a product of NAFTA. Traditional
trade theory clearly points out the fact that trade will undeniably create winners and
losers. Given the fact that Mexico has virtually accepted every demand placed upon by
the US on NAFTA negotiations (large provision on free movement of goods and capital)
as quoted earlier, at least, some provisions on cross-border movement of unskilled
workers should have been one of Mexico’s top negotiating priorities. Unfortunately it
was not! That topic was too “hot” to handle in trade negotiations was the official
response of all the governments involved (Delgado-Wise, 2004).
Abundant unskilled labor force is one of the main factor endowment differences
between Mexico and its two developed partners. The efficient allocation of this resource
throughout the region could not have brought anything but benefits to the trading bloc.
Instead, some provisions for the cross-border movement of skilled workers were included
with very restrictive regulations that have had almost a null impact even for skilled
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workers.80 The only outcome of this neglected priority was the further increase of illegal
immigration81 of displaced Mexican farmers to the US and the further brain-drainage of
the already scarce Mexican skilled labor force. Again, as I continue to argue in this
thesis, the development drive of current PTAs is not determined by theory, but by the
outcomes of the negotiations.
In a similar fashion, AFTA has not been much more successful than NAFTA in
creating market access opportunities for its members in the services sectors. This is quite
unfortunate since many AFTA economies, such as the economy of Singapore (60% of its
GDP), are heavily dependant on services. The rest all have in average from 40% to 50%
of their GDP in these sectors (ASEAN Secretariat, 2006). However, unlike NAFTA, if
AFTA has not created any real opportunities in this sector, at least it has not delivered
any negative results as in the case of Mexico. This has to do mainly with the modus
operandi AFTA adopted to regulate trade in services.
Basically, AFTA’s regulation of services is based on GATS regulations with some
“Plus” provisions, which means it operates under the positive list approach.82 Services
liberalization in AFTA has made some slow, but substantial progress on a “request-offerapproach” basis.

According to ASEAN Secretariat (2007a), five packages of

liberalization have been passed, which comprise important services industries, such as
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NAFTA provides for the so-called TN Visa allowing skilled Mexican workers to enter the US for
temporary work. The annual cap was placed at 5,500 for Mexican workers, but was left unlimited for
Canadian workers (Hufbauer and Schott, 2005).
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Calculations in Hufbauer and Schott (2005) state that, the number of Mexican emigrants to the US has
more than double in the period of 1991-2000 going from an annual average flow of 165,584 yearly
emigrants to 224,942.
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In a positive list approach “all” sectors are excluded from liberalization, only the ones listed for inclusion
get liberalized (UNCTAD, 2006c).
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tourism, telecommunications, maritime-transport, financial services, construction, airtransport, distribution, business services, and education. Moreover, unlike NAFTA, the
liberalization and harmonization of services in some crucial areas, such as land transport
and professional licenses recognition, has made some substantial progress. For example,
agreements have been made to recognize in all member countries professional licenses to
facilitate the free movement of service providers in the areas of engineering and nursing.
Also, an agreement is being negotiated to facilitate land transport across borders
(ASEAN Secretariat, 2007a).
Without a doubt the impact of liberalization in services in NAFTA and AFTA has
been different. On one hand, the liberalization of services not only brought zero benefits
to Mexico as far as increasing market access and spurring its economic development, but
in some instances this liberalization was harmful. This was mainly due to the negative
list approach that NAFTA embraced and to the supply capacity constraints of Mexico in
this sector. The consequences are that Mexico completely rendered its domestic banking
sector to foreign capital and it has missed out the opportunity to efficiently allocate its
most abundant factor endowment (labor), generating an ever-increasing emigration flow
to its northern partners (mainly the US). AFTA members, on the other hand, have not
made much progress on benefiting from the potential of liberalizing trade in services, but
they certainly have progressively approached the matter in a strategically beneficial
fashion, and at least, AFTA has not have had any significant negative results.
With this, in the next chapter, I strive to explore the potential developmental gains
that foreign investment have, or could have, delivered to Mexico and to the ASEAN-10,
mainly based on the discussion presented in Chapter II.
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CHAPTER IV: FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN NAFTA AND ASEAN
Once again, I would like to recall the discussion in Chapter II, where it was
recognized that foreign investment (mainly in the form of FDI) has the noticeable
potential, at least in theory, of delivering various dynamic developmental benefits to the
host economy. However, it was also emphasized that the “amount” of developmental
benefits created was largely determined by the “quality”, rather than the “quantity”, of
such investments, which in turn will be subject to the factors that attracted them in the
first place (strategy). Most importantly, it was stressed that the realization of such
benefits mostly depends on the host economy’s absorbing capacities and the proactive
role of the government to shape the outcome.
According to UNCTAD-World Investment Report (2006d), global inflows of
foreign investments have marked a third consecutive year of growth in 2006, raising to
US$1.3 trillion and almost reaching the record level of US$1.4 trillion achieved in 2000.
However, the lion’s share is still directed to industrialized countries, which attracted 66%
of it. Although the share of DCs has also increased, they are still lagging behind.
There are many factors, mainly domestic policies and capabilities, that have been
proven efficient in attracting foreign investments, as discussed in Chapter II.83 However,
getting these factors synchronized and improving the country’s attractiveness for foreign
investments is not a simple task to achieve, especially for DCs. Instead, during the last
83

See for example, UNCATD (1999); Miyamoto (2003); and Plummer and Cheong (2008); and Lall and
Narula (2004) for a more extensive discussion on FDI determinants.
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decade or so, entering International Investment Agreements (IIAs) has gained in
popularity among DCs in efforts to attract foreign investors (UNCTAD, 2006b). These
agreements, which oftentimes function as a sort “investment-insurance-policy”,
alleviating foreign investor’s concerns in regards to DCs’ economic, political, and legal
reliability, are pursued by DCs in hope of increasing their credibility as attractive
destinations for foreign investments.
The efficiency of IIAs as foreign investment magnets is a matter of current
disputes, as previously mentioned, and further discussing the issue is beyond my scope
here.84 However, it is important to stress the fact that their rapid proliferation85 is of
serious concern, for it could potentially trigger a race-to-the-bottom effect putting at risk
national development strategies (Stiglitz and Charlton, 2005). Moreover, UNCTAD
(2006c) warns of the fact that commitments in these agreements significantly reduce the
policy-space flexibility available to domestic governments in meeting their development
goals.

This negative consequence of IIAs is oftentimes neglected by DCs, that try to

offer the best investor-concessions in order to attract them, overlooking the fact that this
could well offset many of the benefits of foreign investments, since these concessions
stipulate foreign investors’ rights, but hardly ever address their obligations.
This chapter evaluates and compares the effects that the formation of AFTA and
the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA)86 have had on foreign investment patterns in the
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For further discussion, see for example, Plummer and Cheong (2008) and Lesher and Miroudot (2005).
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According to UNCTAD (2007a), in 2006 there were more than 2,500 BITs, and 240 PTAs that included
investment provisions. Moreover, UNCTAD (in Stiglitz and Charlton, 2005, p. 150) reports that DCs are
quite active in entering IIA at all levels, accounting for 42% of total new BITs in 2001.
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AIA was formed in October of 1998 by the ASEAN member countries (at the time) to promote intraforeign investment inflows (see below), for more detail go to: http://www.aseansec.org/6462.htm .
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ASEAN-10 and the effects that the inclusion of investment provisions in NAFTA has had
on Mexico’s foreign investment. An analysis and comparison of the commitments and
concessions in each respective agreement will allow me to assess the strategy’s efficiency
in attracting more and better foreign investments and also to determine the amount of
potential development benefits that could have been created from the quantity and quality
of such investments, notwithstanding the fact that the ultimate realization of those
benefits will depend on the DC itself.
The first section, mainly based on UNCTAD (2006b), summarizes some of the
most important characteristics in IIAs in order to offer a general understanding of the
developmental implications of these schemes, reflecting the price that DCs (in this case
Mexico and the ASEAN-10) have to pay in order to attract foreign investment. The
second section thoroughly reviews how Mexico and the ASEAN-10 sought to attract
foreign investment under their respective accords (strategy), how much foreign
investment (quantity) these strategies attracted, and finally what type of foreign
investment was attracted and to what sectors (quality). This analysis should contribute to
the overall assessment of the developmental impact that foreign investment has had on
Mexico and the ASEAN-10 during their respective accords.

4. 1. Common Characteristics of IIAs
According to UNCTAD (2006b), there is long list of clauses and characteristics
that most current IIAs include and which regulate the flow of foreign investment between
home and host economies.

From a development perspective, they function as the

determinants of the final impact and direction that foreign investment inflows will have
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or take once the agreement has been signed. It is also important to note that most IIAs do
not include backtrack clauses in the case of miscalculation and/or underutilization of the
clauses. These specific features of IIAs can be an efficient tool that can be used to attract
foreign investment by “locking-in” favorable concessions for international investors. At
the same time, they oftentimes go against the developmental strategies of many DCs, as
already motioned. Following is a list of some of the most important characteristics that
might have a direct impact on the development benefits that increased inward FDI could
or would have on the host economy.87

A). The Negative-List-Approach: As explained by UNCTAD (2006c), this
approach to investment treaties offers many opportunities because it tactically allows
negotiators to pick and choose what sectors to liberalize to foreign investment and under
what conditions. At the same time, it requires a far more sophisticated set of negotiating
skills, administrative resources, and information available, if it is to be utilized positively.
However, in the case of DCs, it could be a disadvantage since they traditionally lack all
of the above. Hence, there could be potential misutilization of the scope of the agreement
on the exceptions that need to be made in crucial sectors for development (see Lesher and
Miroudot, 2005 for further discussion).
Therefore, a positive list approach could be better managed by DCs when entering
IIAs, especially with developed partners that possess far reaching capabilities (N-S
PTAs).

Unfortunately for Mexico, NAFTA’s investment provisions embrace the

negative list approach as opposed to AIA that embraces the positive list approach.
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B). Expropriation Clauses: A justifiable major impetus in the negotiation of IIAs
is to obtain protection for foreign investments against expropriation by the host country,
which is widely accepted in customary international law.88 However, the drawback of
this clause in IIAs is not concerned with “direct” expropriation, but rather, with the
interpretation of “indirect” expropriation, which is included in some IIAs like NAFTA’s
Art. 1110.89 This is quite dangerous since it can be abused by TNCs against local
governments, which in turn hesitate to pass any change of laws regarding the directing of
such investments in line with domestic development projects in areas such as the
environment and health (Arroyo Picard et. al., 2003).
A broad interpretation of “indirect” expropriation further guarantees foreign
investors protection but hardly addresses their obligations. Indeed, NAFTA’s Art. 1110
and its broad interpretation of “indirect” expropriation has generated a very significant
number of investors-state disputes between investors and governments in the NAFTA
countries. A report issued by Public Citizen in 2005 reports 42 cases of claims filed
against all three NAFTA parties by foreign investors with a total worth of US$28 billion.
The Mexican government has been the most affected of the three NAFTA governments,
with a total of 43% of the claims against, or 18 cases worth almost 50% of the total
awards to investors, US$16.5 billion out of a US$35 billion total.90 The US has also been
sued by foreign investors (mostly Canadian), but according to the same report, the US has
88

The UN Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of State, (GA Res. 3281 (xxix), UN GAOR, 29th Sess.,
Supp. No. 31 (1974) 50) fully recognizes the rights against expropriation without full compensation.
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For a full description of this article go to: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/chap-111.asp#A1110 .
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See Public Citizen Report (2005) for further detail on particular cases, awards, and general information
on the subject. Also Arroyo Picard et. al. (2003) present a detailed analysis of the implications that these
cases have had on Mexico.
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not lost a single case. It reflects the importance of a capable legal system available in the
host country to face the extensive legal resources that many TNCs possess.
These results have been possible thanks mainly to the general state of the art
dispute settlement mechanism embraced by NAFTA and, specifically, to the arbitration
consent clause in investor-state disputes (NAFTA’s Art. 1122).91 These concessions
largely reduced the policy space available to the Mexican government to strategically
direct inward foreign investments towards its development efforts.
In contrast, ASEAN does not specifically addresses dispute settlement
mechanisms in the corpus of AIA. In fact, as reported by Cuyvers and Pupphavesa
(1996), it has been the subject of several critics in regards to its loose overall dispute
settlement mechanism, which decreases the ASEAN-10’s overall credibility and
attractiveness as foreign investment destination. In response to these critics, ASEAN
members embraced in 1996 the “Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism”, which was
later revisited in 2004 by the “ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement
Mechanism” (ASEAN Secretariat, 1996).92

C). Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) and National Treatment: In short, the MFN
and National Treatment clauses in IIAs imply that foreign investors enjoy the same
conditions applied to both national investors and/or the conditions, when more favorable,
applied to any other foreign investor that is not part of the agreement. This potentially
limits the government’s policy space to favor national investors which most of the times
91

For an original version of this article go to: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/chap-112.asp#A1122
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Go to: http://www.aseansec.org/16654.htm for a detailed version of these agreements.
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are already at a disadvantage against TNCs that enjoy the size effect and better access to
international capital markets. For this reason, an increasing number of countries involved
in IIAs oftentimes delimit this concession only to the MFN omitting national treatment to
foreign investors (UNCTAD, 2006b).
Unlike NAFTA that includes both clauses (NAFTA’s Art. 1102-1103
respectively),93 AIA only includes the MFN clause (Art.8.1),94 though the members have
committed to include the national treatment clause in all the included investing sectors in
AIA after 2010 (ASEAN Secretariat, 1998). Moreover, some AIA members, such as
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore on their individual external IIAs, do not
include the national treatment clause and/or do so only in strategically selected sectors in
which national investors would not be able to meet the investment requirements needed
to promote the development of those sectors (UNCTAD, 2006b). This strategy reflects a
proactive involvement of local governments in beneficially directing inward FDI.

D). Performance Requirements: This clause is perhaps the most important
mechanism that DCs can embrace in IIAs, allowing them to have some sort of strategic
direction of FDI towards meeting their development goals.

For example, the

implementation of performance requirements can help to ensure that FDI contributes to
employment, to the overall economic activity in the host economy (creating forward and
backward linkages), and to facilitate technology transfers by requiring foreign investors
to act in line with the country’s development, and not only on their own interests.
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For original text go to: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/chap-111.asp#A1102.
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For original text go to: http://www.aseansec.org/7994.pdf .
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This clause, however, is incompatible with the national treatment clause, which
releases the foreign investor from any requirements that local investors are not subject to.
Mexico, obviously, by embracing the MFN and national treatment of foreign investors
under NAFTA, has given up the possibility of ensuring that foreign investment projects
are favorable to its development process.95 On the other hand, many ASEAN countries,
not having committed to national treatment to foreign investors, have had the opportunity
to strategically use this clause to direct inward FDI and to ensure it has a positive impact
on the economy.

Moreover, some ASEAN schemes such as ASEAN Industrial

Cooperation Scheme (AICO),96 which I discuss in greater detail later, do have specific
performance requirements and investor obligations. In fact, most projects entering the
ASEAN zone in the manufacturing sector have to be, at least, previously approved by the
host economy (see below).

E). Transfer of Funds or “Transfer-Pricing”: Suppose that corporate taxes are
higher in the host economy of a certain FDI project than in the home economy. This
invites foreign investors to remit their profits to the home country. This situation could
have a negative impact on the host economy because, if TNCs are able to extract their
profits via intra-company transactions at artificial prices, the benefits of foreign
investment to the host economy are accordingly reduced (UNCTAD, 1999). In addition,
UNCTAD (2006b) reports that allowing free transfers of funds from foreign investors is
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NAFTA Art. 1106 prohibits any type of performance requirement as specifically stated on the full text of
the article, go to: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/chap-111.asp#A1106 .
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AICO was agreed upon at the informal ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting in April 1996 and came
into effect in November 1996 in each ASEAN country, go to: http://www.aseansec.org/6400.htm.
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of further concern to the host economies, especially when foreign exchange reserves are
low. For example, if a foreign investor seeks to transfer a large amount, it further
depletes exchange reserves needed for other purposes.

Another concern is that,

permitting free transfers might result on a massive capital flight during time of economic
difficulty, thereby, exacerbating the host country’s problems.
Article 1109 of NAFTA97 explicitly allows members to freely transfer funds at
any times without restrictions. On the other hand, AIA specifically addresses the issue in
article 1598 to safeguard the balance of payment, allowing host economies to invoke this
article in case of emergencies in regards to the concerns mentioned above.

F). Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Protection: Although IPR protection is
not specifically included as part of IIAs,99 it does, however, directly affect the beneficial
outcomes from inward FDI, such as the level of technology transfers that can take place
among the trading partners. Therefore, it is more than relevant to discuss the issue in this
section.

The argument regarding adequate protection of IPR and development is

extremely complex, and adequately discussing it is beyond the scope of this thesis (see
Lall and Albaladejo, 2002). Rather, I will only point out some general implications of
IPR protection on development and what has been the approach of NAFTA and ASEAN.
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For original text go to: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/chap-111.asp#A1109 .
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For a full text of AIA art. 15 go to: http://www.aseansec.org/7994.pdf.
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Rather, IPR protection, in most PTAs, is included as a separate part of the agreement as a characteristic
of “deep-integration” and “new-regionalism” (Chapter I). IPR protection packages are included in PTAs
for different reasons. For example, in N-S PTAs, such as NAFTA, IPR protection packages are accepted
by the DC in exchange with other benefits – for example, market access. In S-S PTAs, IPR protection is
less important for any member; hence, it usually takes the form of loose side agreements.
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The general available literature on IPR protection and development, at best, has
generated the typical answer in economics: “it depends”. In this case, whether strong or
lax IPR protection has a positive impact on development “depends” on the country’s
level of development. This means that an economy at an advanced level of development
will benefit from strong IPR protection, and less developed economies will probably
benefit from lax IPR protection. For example, lax IPR protection allows DCs to imitate
and reverse engineer to upgrade their technological base, after a threshold is passed,100
strong IPR protection can become beneficial by stimulating new private innovation. This
suggests that the forerunners in technological change (industrialized countries) will
benefit the most from strong IPR protection
According to UNCTAD (2006b), there are two main approaches to the adequate
protection of IPR in most IIAs. First, negotiating members of the agreement opt for
adopting the already existent international standards, such as the WTO Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).

Second, some accords go beyond

international standards and opt for creating their own set of IPR regulations.
In the case of ASEAN, IPR protection mainly falls under the first category.
ASEAN members have been continuously promoting the importance of IPR protection
for the sake of technological and economic advancement,101 but have not gone far from
their TRIPS obligations, and take instead a rather lax approach. The ASEAN-10 mainly
regulate IPR protection and promotion though the “ASEAN Framework Agreement on
100

Lall and Albaladejo (2002, p. 6) identify the turning point to be US$7,750 per capita income in 1985
prices. These authors refer to other studies such as, Chang (2001) and Rasiah (2001) for further detail.
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Lall and Albaladejo (2002) point out that the creation and diffusion of new knowledge are desirable and
beneficial for growth; hence, it is necessary to trade off static optimization in favor of dynamic
considerations, inducing private agents to invest in the production of new knowledge.
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Intellectual Property Cooperation”,102 which mainly revolves around the obligations in
the TRIPS agreement.
In contrast, NAFTA goes far beyond the regular requirements of TRIPS, adapting
its own rules for IPR protection (NAFTA’s Chapter, 17).103 This has had an extra
negative impact on Mexico, not only from extra costs implementing a national set of laws
that fit both the TRIPS agreement and NAFTA’s regulations, but it also significantly
reduces the potential of benefiting from any technological spillovers due to the strict
regulations concerning patents, copyrights, and trademarks from its developed trading
partners (Arroyo Picard ed. al., 2003).

4.2. Foreign Investment Evolvements
Mexico and the ASEAN-10 have both opted for the PTA-Formation-Strategy to
attract foreign investment as stated in their respective objectives.104 The overall real
efficiency of this strategy in both instances is, however, a matter of dispute. On the one
hand, FDI stocks in both instances seem to have been accumulating at a faster pace since
the respective accords took place, suggesting that on average inflows have indeed
increased (figure IV.1).

But on the other hand, some economists105 argue that the

respective accords were not the reason for such increase, but rather that many other
factors that were taking place at the same time, such as world investment trends.
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For a full text version of this chapter go to: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/naftatce.asp.

104

AIA Art. 3(i) at: http://www.aseansec.org/7994.pdf), and NAFTA Art. 102(c) at:
http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/chap-01.asp#Chap.I).
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In the case of NAFTA, see for example, Arroyo Picard et. al. (2003) and Ramirez (2003). For the
ASEAN schemes, see for example, Plummer and Cheong (2008).
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Figure IV.1. FDI Stock Evolution: 1995-2006
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Source. Author’s calculations from UNCTAD (2006d) data.

However, this issue of quantity is not of much relevance to the scope of this
research Rather, the quality and direction given to such investments is what counts the
most for development, as it has been discussed throughout this thesis and stressed by
some economists including Lall and Narula (2004). Moreover, the overall ultimate
impact on development will not be determined by the quantity and/or quality of foreign
investment, but could be further influenced by the commitments and concessions
embraced in each accord as discussed previously, where bargaining power and
asymmetries among members, once again, will play a determinant role in drafting a
development-friendly accord.
By grouping the main characteristics of each agreement (see the previous section),
a clear difference can be observed between NAFTA’s investment provisions and the
ASEAN-10 investment schemes. On the one hand, by accepting certain conditions on
regulating inward foreign investment under NAFTA, Mexico seems to have adopted a
passive and general full liberalization of foreign investment with little or no restrictions at
all, thereby relying on market forces to do a government’s job.106 On the other hand, the
ASEAN-10 seem to have taken a more cautious and conservative approach to foreign
106

Ramirez (2003, p. 874) quotes an ECLAC (2002) report in which is expressed that …”of the 704
(sectors) listed in the Mexican Classification, 606 are fully open to foreign capital, as share of up to 49% is
permitted in 35 others, prior authorization from the National Foreign Investment Commission (CNIE) is
required in 37, and FDI participation in not allowed in only 16 cases”.
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investment liberalization in order to leave some space for the governments to play a
proactive role in directing it.
Hence, in this section, it is necessary to analyze the different approaches in order
to confirm the above deduction and to access each strategy’s efficiency in attracting more
and better foreign investment that would ultimately enhance their development. This can
be done by posing simple but essential questions: i) how and how much foreign
investment has each strategy attracted?, and ii) what type of foreign investment have they
attracted, from whom, and to what sectors?

4.2.1. How and How Much Foreign Investment was Attracted?
One of Mexico’s key objectives in NAFTA was to attract foreign investment, not
only from its trade partners, but from the rest of the world, as documented by some
authors including Tornell and Esquivel (1997), and it accomplished it.107 It was mainly
due to the very favorable conditions offered to investors, especially to US and Canada
invertors, but also to a lesser extent to extra-NAFTA investors. Mexico’s principal tool
in the NAFTA accord to attract foreign investment is Chapter 11,108 which embraces one
of the most favorable set of investment conditions that exist today. It embraces a large
scope of coverage for sectors to be liberalized (the negative list approach). It includes the
MFN and national treatment principle (Art. 1102 and 1103). It guarantees a minimum
standard treatment to investors (Art. 1105).

It does not include any performance
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Waldkirch (2003) and The World Bank (2003) (in Lesher and Miroudot, 2005, p. 32) report a clear
positive effect of NAFTA on FDI in Mexico, and suggest that this positive effect has come almost
exclusively from raising investment from Canada and the United States, rather than from other countries
wishing to access the NAFTA market.
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For a full text version of Chapter 11 go to: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/naftatce.asp.
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requirements (Art. 1106). It includes few exceptions (the most important exception of
the accord is the National Oil Industry (PEMEX)).109 It allows free transfer of funds
(Art. 1109). It includes a direct and indirect expropriation clause (Art.1110). Investors
from the NAFTA area enjoy a quite reliable dispute settlement mechanism. And it
includes many other investor rights with little mention to their obligations.110
Moreover, as already mentioned, the favorable trends of world’s investment
inflows and being one of the largest developing economies has allowed Mexico to
increase its foreign investment stock from about US$41 billion in 1995 to US$228 billion
in 2006 (figure IV.1). To what extent NAFTA is responsible for this is a matter of large
disputes based on two grounds. Firstly, it is argued that NAFTA had not much to do in
attracting more foreign investment and that other internal factors and world trends were
the main reasons, even though, disentangling one from the other has proven to be a
challenging task (Ramirez, 2003). Secondly, it is simply argued by some economists that
there was no real increase of inward foreign investment during the period of NAFTA in
comparison to previous periods, but that there was an annual average decrease.111 The
only thing that NAFTA is responsible for is the type of foreign investment that came into
Mexico (Arroyo Picard et. al., 2003, p. 42) (see below).
On the other hand, the ASEAN-10 have for a long time been important
independent recipients of foreign investment, especially the five founding members
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For a full list of exceptions go to: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/anx3mex.asp .
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Base on data from Mexico’s National Bank, Arroyo Picard et. al. (2003, p. 42) report that yearly average
foreign investment inflows to Mexico were higher during the period before NAFTA than during the period
of NAFTA, US$16.5 billion and US$15 billion per year in average, respectively.
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(Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines).112 However, as Cuyvers
and Pupphavesa (1996) point out, at the beginning of the ‘90s, the ASEAN economies
perceived the threat of investment diversion due to the rise of China and other East and
South Asian countries that were perceived as attractive destinations for foreign investors,
bypassing many of the advantages that these economies previously enjoyed. Hence, “reattracting” foreign investment for the founding members and attracting more foreign
investments for late comers (Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) were the
key motivations to form AFTA, AIA, and AICO, in order to better compete with other
emerging economies in the region. As Plummer and Cheong (2008) state, the intent was
to form a “one-stop investment center” with a broader, and more integrated productionbase, offering investors the opportunity to reap larger benefits from scale economies,
transaction costs reduction, and vertical integration of production.
As Mexico did in NAFTA, the ASEAN-10 intended to attract intra-bloc
investments, but for the ASEAN-10, it was more important to attract extra-bloc
investments, which are the largest source in the area (figure IV.6).113 Unlike NAFTA,
however, ASEAN members embraced a lesser attractive structure on their respective
schemes as far as freedom and concessions to foreign investors (see previous section).
ASEAN members created two main schemes to attract intra and extra-bloc foreign
investments, namely AIA and AICO.

AIA is the main tool in promoting general

investments in all sectors included in the accord, which can be compared to NAFTA’s
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In the period of 1995-2004, 86.4% of FDI inflows into the ASEAN area were extra-ASEAN compare to
only 11.6% of intra-ASEAN FDI inflows (ASEAN Secretariat, 2005) (see figure IV.6).
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investment provisions.114 But unlike NAFTA, this scheme embraces, on the one hand,
less friendly concession to foreign investors, but on the other, it leaves more policy space
for the respective governments to direct these investments.
In addition, ASEAN members have also formed another scheme (AICO), which is
strategically designed to attract foreign investment into the industrial sectors, in hopes of
enhancing their technological bases from countries such as Japan, the US, and the EU.
AICO is open to any ASEAN-based company meeting the following requirements: 1) the
company is incorporated in and operates in an ASEAN country, 2) it included a minimum
of 30% ASEAN equity, and 3) the company engages in some form of resource sharing,
such as the sharing of technology, market sharing, or consolidated purchase of raw
materials. There are two important principles in this scheme. One, it is directed to the
industrial sectors, and two, it embraces some sort of performance requirements to
maximize the benefits to the ASEAN-zone. Moreover, each ASEAN member has been
constantly pursuing individual strategies to improve their economic environment and
attract foreign investment (ASEAN Secretariat, 1997).
As reflected in figure IV.1, it appears that, to a certain extent, these schemes and
the unilateral initiatives taken have positively influence the ASEAN-10 FDI stock, rising
from around US$148 billion in 1995 to US$420 billion yearend 2006. However, some
empirical studies suggest that the correlation of the ASEAN schemes has been less
evident and more ambiguous than in NAFTA. For example, Jeon and Stone (2000) find
that the ASEAN schemes have had an insignificant impact on FDI flows, both intra and
114

AIA is mostly directed to intra-bloc investment promotion; however, by further harmonizing ASEAN
investments as whole, AIA could also be a positive force to attract extra-bloc investment. AIA currently
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incidental to the five sectors (“Service incidental”) (Plummer and Cheong, 2008).
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extra-bloc. Nonetheless, Plummer and Cheong (2008) find that AIA, in particular, has
had an insignificant impact on extra-bloc FDI flows, but has influenced significantly and
positively intra-bloc flows.

Moreover, an independent research carried out by the

ASEAN Secretariat in April 2007, “Completing the AIA – Road Traveled, Road Ahead”,
states that AIA has had an overall positive effect on FDI flows, especially in recent years.
To sum up, despite of the fact that there are many other factors influencing FDI
flows and that it is quite difficult to disentangle one from another, it appears that both the
ASEAN-schemes and NAFTA’s investment provisions have positively impacted inward
FDI flows to Mexico and to the ASEAN-10 (increasing quantity). However, it also
seems that NAFTA has had a more evident influence on inward FDI flows than the
ASEAN schemes, suggesting that Mexico’s strategy might have paid off better in terms
the quantity attracted. However, the costs involved in doing it, in terms of policy
reduction, might have also been higher. In other words, Mexico opted for a strategy that
will allow it to increase FDI quantity, and the ASEAN-10 opted for a strategy that allows
them to regulate FDI flows while increasing the quantity.

4.2.2. What Type of Investments and Where Did They go?
Again, as already mentioned, from a development perspective, what matters the
most is quality rather than quantity. Therefore, a better assessment of foreign investment
can be done by analyzing its qualitative features and the direction it has taken within the
host economy(s) in this case Mexico and the ASEAN-10. There is no “stylized” method
to evaluate foreign investment’s “quality”, but an attempt can be made by observing
some key factors, such as the type of investment and activity sought by foreign investors,
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the countries where those investments come from (developed or developing countries),
and the sectors in which these investments were made. It is also important to note that
the quality of such investments will be largely determined by the initial local capabilities
of the host country, and the proactive involvement of local governments will be essential
to give these investments the “right” direction.

A). Portfolio Investments: It was concluded in Chapter II (p. 25) that it is not
quite clear how portfolio investments affect the host economy. Moreover, as pointed out
by Hufbauer and Schott (2005), these types of investments are harder to calculate because
longitudinal data on them is scarce and unreliable. Hence, an adequate discussion on
portfolio investments in NAFTA and ASEAN will not be presented here. Nonetheless,
there is an important difference between NAFTA and AIA worth mentioning in order to
illustrate the potential impact that portfolio investments might have had in both cases.
AIA specifically addresses this issue and prohibits portfolio investments (Art. 2Coverage).115 Hence, it could have no impact on the ASEAN economies. On the other
hand, portfolio investments have been fully liberalized in NAFTA under Chapter 11,
guaranteeing the complete freedom of capital movements. This is interesting, since the
other factor of production, labor, was entirely restricted.
In addition, NAFTA allows freedom of transfer funds (Art. 1109), which makes
this type of foreign investment more irrelevant to the impact that the inflow of foreign
capital might have had on Mexico’s development efforts. Instead, portfolio investments
might have had a negative impact on Mexico. For example, some economists, including
115

For a full-text version go to http://www.aseansec.org/7994.pdf.
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Ramirez (2003) and Arroyo Picard et. al. (2003), argue that large capital inflows of socalled “hot-money” during NAFTA‘s eve and opening might have worsened, if not
directly caused the Mexican “Tequila/Peso Crisis” of 1995 by flooding the Mexican
financial system with foreign capital from highly volatile international capital markets.

B). FDI Inflows: In Chapter II (p. 26/34), there were identified four main types of
FDI which each offer different positive externalities to the host economy. It was also
discussed that, historically, most DCs have mainly attracted efficiency-seeking
investments into low-technology manufacturing sectors (UNCTAD, 1999). Partially, this
is due to the fact that most DCs are endowed with large unskilled labor surplus, which
makes labor cheap and attractive for TNCs. Also, as explained by Lesher and Miroudot
(2004), on one hand, the reduction of trade barriers resulting from PTAs reduces marketseeking or “tariff-jumping” investments from firms characterized by high fixed costs, and
on the other, this allows efficiency-seeking investments to increase. Indeed, this pattern
has taken place in Mexico and in the ASEAN-10 which have mainly attracted efficiencyseeking FDI to their manufacturing sectors – 62.87% during the period of 1994-2000, and
34% in the period of 1999-2004 respectively (figure IV.2).
Figure IV.2. Inward FDI by Sector in Mexico and the ASEAN-10
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0,80%
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Source: Author’s adaptation from various sources. (Mexico’s figures are from Arroyo Picard et. al.
(2003, p. 47) – 1999-2000. The ASEAN-10’s figures are from ASEAN Secretariat (2006) – 1999-2004.
Note: the high share of investment in Mexico’s financial services includes a one time large investment of
US$12.5 billion due to the City Bank’s purchase of Banamex.
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It was also concluded in Chapter II, that efficiency-seeking investments put at the
doorstep of the host economy substantial initial benefits according to the level of
development, but a certain absorbing capacity was necessary to capture such benefits.
Also, a proactive role of the government was fundamental, not only in order to direct
FDI, but most importantly, to retain initial investments by constantly stimulating local
capabilities through policies that involve all local economic agents. Thus, this subsection
thoroughly analyzes whether or not Mexico and the ASEAN-10 have been able to benefit
from the large FDI inflows experienced during their respective accords.
Although there are controversies about the extent to which NAFTA helped
Mexico to attract FDI, there is a unanimous consent about the fact that NAFTA has
favored a net inflow of FDI as opposed to portfolio investments (table IV.1).
Table IV.1. Mexico’s Total Foreign Investment (in US$ millions)

Source: Statistics based on the bank of Mexico presented by Arroyo Picard et. al. (2003, p. 43)

However, despite this positive feature of NAFTA, many studies suggest that
inward FDI has yet to deliver overall positive effects to the Mexican economy.116 The
main reason expressed in these studies has to due with the general passive role of the
Mexican government in directing FDI, in part enforced by the rules and regulations of
NAFTA’s Chapter 11. This has created two evident enclave FDI destinations (figure
IV.3): one, the Federal District (Mexico City), which is by and large historically the most
vibrant economic area of the country and to which increased FDI comes without surprise;
116

For example, Hufbauer and Schott (2005); UNCTAD (2007b); Ramirez (2003); and Arroyo Picard et.
al. (2003) to name just a few.
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and two, the northern part of the country, mainly in the maquiladora sectors, which are
highly disarticulated from the rest of the economy (Chapter III, p. 61).
Figure IV.3. Inward FDI flows To Mexico by Area (1994-2000)
Federal District (Mexico City)

Northern States

Rest of Mexico

60,44%

29,41%

10,15%

1

Source: Adaptation from Arroyo Picard et. al. (2003, p. 50)
Notes: 1) Mexico City’s data includes the State of Mexico. 2) 19.35% in the northern sates went to the
maquiladora sector. 3) some states in the rest of Mexico such as Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero, Hidalgo
and Veracruz (all southern states) accounted only for 0.31 % of all FDI.

Most of the initial FDI projects in the maquiladora sectors were efficiencyseeking (looking for low-cost labor), which is perfectly normal for DCs according to their
actual level of domestic capabilities and endowments. However, in the case of Mexico,
the two FDI enclaves have not only hardly generated any benefits like forward and
backward linkages and/or technology spillovers for the rest of the economy, but also have
largely contributed to the marginalization of other geographical areas and important
sectors for development. For example, as reflected in figure IV.3, most rural/agrarian
central and southern states have received a mere 0.31% of total. The agricultural sector
have received 0.37% in the period of 1994-2000, electricity and water sectors received
0.35%, construction 0.90%, and transport infrastructure 0.52% (figure IV.2).117
Unfortunately, these areas and sectors have not only been marginalized by foreign
investors, but they have not received much attention from domestic investments either.

117

See Arroyo Picard et. al. (2003) for more detailed on the omitted figures in figure IV.3.
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The second largest recipient sector of inward foreign investment during the period
of NAFTA in Mexico has been the financial sector, accounting for 14.1% of the total
(figure IV.2). However, this has mostly taken place in the form of M&As, which, as
discussed in Chapter II, generates few benefits for development.
Furthermore, it is also important to point out the fact that a great part of Mexican
inward FDI comes from one country, the US. In fact, the US accounted for 73% of total
FDI yearend 2000, which means that Mexico suffers a high degree of dependency, not
only on US economic performance, but also on NAFTA investment provisions.
Today, Mexico is not only losing old FDI projects to cheaper labor places as well
as its competitiveness to attract new FDI,118 but it has also been unable to upgrade the
type of FDI that flows into the economy.

This has been partially due to the

underutilization119 and low connection of the large FDI inflows during the first years of
NAFTA, which did not accrue any real dynamic benefits that would upgrade the Mexican
economy as a whole (Arroyo Picard et. al., 2003). But most importantly, this clearly
reflects the total neglect of the government in shaping and overseeing the investment
dynamics in the country towards meeting its development goals.
In contrast, the ASEAN schemes have been, comparatively, more restrictive as
far as performance requirements and general foreign investor’s concessions. This has
allowed, to a certain extent, the respective local governments to play a proactive role in
directing FDI projects. For example, the AICO scheme has permitted the ASEAN
118

According to UNCTAD (2006d) figures, Mexico’s FDI inflows have decreased since their pick in 2001
– about US$27.5 billion, sharply dropping to US$19 billion in 2006.
119

According to FDI Indexes created by UNCTAD, Mexico has been underperforming according to its
potentials for the past years (http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2468&lang=1# ).
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governments to strategically direct on average 85% of total inward FDI during the period
from 1999 to 2006.

That is US$208 billion out US$241 billion, which came on

“Approval and Appointment Basis” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2005).

Of course, further

analysis is necessary at the disaggregated level to figure out if these investments went to
the “right” areas and sectors to avoid enclaves, as it has been the case in Mexico.120
Perhaps at this point it is also pertinent to briefly take a look at the geographical
distribution of inward FDI among ASEAN members, which could be of some relevance
to the individual economic development of each of them. That is also because any
aggregate analysis of ASEAN evolvements can be bias when compared to NAFTA.
Indeed, the geographical distribution of inward FDI in ASEAN is quite uneven with
countries like Singapore who attract the lion’s share of the total amount (figure IV.4).
This is certainly not good news for members like Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, which
so far have been largely left out of picture, receiving a mere 0.7%, 0.2% and 1.6% of the
total respectively (figure IV.4). However, as pointed out by Plummer and Cheong (2008,
p. 6), these countries, and perhaps the entire ASEAN zone, could have been performing
much worse without Singapore in the field, which serves as both an entrepot center for
intra-ASEAN trade and a hub for FDI.

Hence, while Singapore apparently does

extremely well by almost any measure in attracting FDI, its destiny in many ways is
linked to the economic performance of the region.
Besides, unlike the marginalized states in Mexico, which have not experienced
much investment from the enclave FDI areas, the marginalized ASEAN countries such as
Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia received, in the period of 1995-2000, a very significant
120

Mainly due to data restrictions, such analysis is not provided here. Few links to some of these data can
be found at ASEAN Secretariat’s at: http://www.aseansec.org/ . Also, see Chapter V for few other details.
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part of their total FDI inflows from other ASEAN countries, 28%, 51%, and 20%
respectively (ASEAN Secretariat, 2005).
Figure IV.4. FDI in ASEAN by Host Country, 1995-2004
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Source: ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Statistical Yearbook (2005).

There is another aspect of FDI in ASEAN that is important to point out as
different in comparison to what has been taking place in Mexico. FDI in ASEAN seems
to have been occurring in a more “diversified” manner among sectors and among
industries within sectors. For instance, although the manufacturing sector in ASEAN has
received a great part of total inward FDI, it is no where near the monopolization that has
taken place in Mexico in this sector, 34% and 62.87% respectively (figure IV.2). This
has allowed a greater number of other complementary sectors to internally develop in
ASEAN. Moreover, the number of industries involved within the manufacturing sector
also appears to be more diverse in ASEAN (figure IV.5) than in Mexico, which mostly
only includes two – autos and electronics.
Figure IV.5. Top-10 Intra-ASEAN FDI into Manufacturing, 1999-2004.
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Source: ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Statistical Yearbook (2005).
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Rubber & Prod.
Petroleum & Prod.

Furthermore, diversification of FDI in ASEAN is not only confined to sectors and
industries, but it is also present in the very origin of such investments. Unlike Mexico
that largely depends on US investment, the ASEAN-10 have been able to keep a constant
inflow of FDI from countries all over the world, such as Japan, the EU, the US, numerous
Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs) in Asia including South Korea, Taiwan, and
Hong Kong, as well as from DCs such as China and India, which although they have
small shares, still do contribute to the overall diversification of inward FDI (figure IV.6).
Figure IV.6. FDI in ASEAN by Source Country, 1999-2004
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According to UNCTAD (2006d), the origin of FDI can be an important
determinant in attracting FDI, but most importantly, it might also largely influence the
amount of dynamic benefits that the host economy could derive from such FDI. For
example, inward FDI from TNCs from DCs can oftentimes result more beneficial than
FDI from TNCs from developed countries, mainly because the characteristics of TNCs
from DCs tend to be more in line with the overall needs of host-DCs, since they come
from DCs themselves. This implies a narrower technology gap between host and home
firms,121 generating easier to absorb technology spillovers. It could also translate into

121

Aslanoglu, 2000; Kokko, 1996; and Liu et. al., 2000 (in UNCTAD, 2006d, p. 188) concluded that the
technological gap between home and host firms was successfully closed when it was initially significantly
small, but when the gap was critically larger, it would widen even further in subsequent years. (the studies
refer to Mexico, United Kingdom, and Turkey).
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more employment opportunities given the level of skill in DCs122 and greater backward
and forward linkages with local firms since home and host economic structures are
similar, and thus, easier to replace home-products with host-economy-products (income
similarities). In other words, given the similar economic and business cultures and
similar production processes, it is more likely that TNCs from DCs, as opposed to the
ones from developed countries, are more beneficial from a development perspective.
Hence, because the ASEAN zone has more diversified FDI inflows, with large amounts
coming from DCs, it could be suggested that the ASEAN-10 might have benefited more
from inward FDI than Mexico under NAFTA. It could also further explain the overall
different impact on development that the ASEAN-10 and Mexico have experienced.
To sum up, from the discussion in this chapter, a rather evident difference
emerges in comparing Mexico’s experience under NAFTA’s investment provision and
the experience of the ASEAN-10 from the ASEAN investment schemes. That is, given
the more conservative approach to the overall management of FDI, the ASEAN-10 have,
at least, been able to maintain some sort of control in directing inward FDI. Partially, this
has resulted in a more “diverse” FDI atmosphere as far as distribution and the origin of
foreign investments is concerned. This, in turn, allows the local economies to reduce the
risk of “dependency” on enclave development sectors and economic slowdowns in the
source of foreign investments. By the same token, this has increased the possibility of
capturing a greater part of dynamic gains resulting from different types of FDI, a subject
that I will briefly discuss in the next chapter.

122

On average per foreign affiliate, UNCTAD (2006d) reports that TNCs from DCs were found to employ
more local workers – especially in low-skill industries, than those from developed countries for every
million of US$ spent.
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CHAPTER V: A BRIEF DEVELOPMENT REVIEW
Many economists have repeatedly stated that it is extremely difficult to
disentangle the actual effects of PTAs on an economy, for the reason that there are many
other non-PTA factors and circumstances involved in the changes that the economy
experiences.123 Hence, by no means, the content of this chapter is to be interpreted as the
exclusive effect of NAFTA and the ASEAN schemes (AFTA, AIA, and AICO) on
Mexico’s and the ASEAN-10’s development, respectively.

Nonetheless, it is also

unrealistic to expect no contributional effect from these agreements on their respective
economies, since both accords, as discussed in the previous two chapters, have somewhat
influenced the trade and foreign investment patters of Mexico and the ASEAN-10.
By looking at some common indicators based mainly on the discussions in this
research, this chapter reviews the economic development evolution that Mexico and the
ASEAN-10 have experienced during their respective PTA era. However, I want to
strongly emphasize that the intent of this chapter, and that of the entire research for that
matter, is not to present a “quantitative” potential effect of the PTAs discussed here;
rather, it merely attempts to offer a “qualitative” analysis of what could have happen
given the relevant circumstances.
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See for example, Krueger (1999a); Ramirez (2003); and Baldwin and Venables, 1995 (in Lo Turco
2003, p. 10).
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5.1. Mexico’s Economic Development Evolution
In January 1st of 1994, NAFTA took full effect as the first agreement of its kind
involving developed countries and DCs. Immediately after, as Carlsen (2005) puts it,
“promoters began to identify it as the project that would usher Mexico into the First
World, leaving behind decades of intransigent poverty and underdevelopment”. This was
despite the fact that in NAFTA’s objectives (Art. 102),124 there is nothing that
“specifically” refers to the agreement as an instrument to enhance growth and
development or to achieve income convergence; rather, its main objective was, and
remains, to exclusively eliminate trade and investment barriers.
Nonetheless, supporters quickly identified the elimination of tariffs and foreign
investment regulations as the assurance for Mexico to benefit from increased market
access and inward foreign investment. In other words, the long-delayed process of
economic development could finally take off for Mexico.

Accordingly, several

judgments were made on the potential impact that NAFTA would have on Mexico’s
economy. UNCTAD (2007b, p. 65) presents a summary of these estimates as follows:
Estimation exercises in the run-up to NAFTA, mostly based on applied
general equilibrium models, produced various results, depending on the
methodology and assumptions. A review of several of these studies by the
United States Congressional Budget Office (1993) found a consensus that
NAFTA would produce winners and losers, but a total net gain. The effects on
Mexico were expected to be the most substantial, because of its greater trade
barriers and smaller economy than those of its NAFTA partners. Most of the
studies estimated that improved resource allocation as a result of trade
liberalization under NAFTA would raise Mexico’s GDP, but by less than 1.1%.
When the effects of economies of scale were included, estimates of the increase
in Mexico’s GDP ranged from 1.7% to around 3.4%, but they were even much
higher if investment effects were also considered, ranging from 3.1% to around
12.7%. Moreover, according to this review, the most important effect would
come from productivity growth and technology spillovers.
124

For a full list of NAFTA’s objectives go to: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/chap-01.asp#A102 .
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Furthermore, for Mexico, the biggest winner of the agreement, there were also
expected large benefits as far as employment and real wages go. Ramirez (2003) reports
that, it was expected that as much as a 6.6% increase in employment and a 12% increase
in real income, or more, by the end of NAFTA’s phased implementation would take
place. Moreover, Hufbauer and Schott (2005) point out that Mexican political leaders
optimistically promised that NAFTA would generate one million new jobs each year and
begin to address the misery of subsistence labor in rural areas.
However, comparing the above estimated figures to the actual evolution of the
Mexican economy during the more than ten years of NAFTA’s implementation, it
appears that NAFTA has succeeded in meeting its “listed” objectives, increased trade and
investment flows, but has fallen short in meeting the expectations in other aspects.
From a traditional Viner’s perspective, NAFTA has mostly resulted in trade
creation at the aggregate level according to several authors.125

However, at the

disaggregated level, some studies have found trade diversion in the textile and apparel
sectors.126 These are interesting findings, especially because Mexico could have largely
benefited from increased market access in these sectors, in which it enjoyed a
comparative advantage. It appears that Mexico ended up on the “losing” side in this case,
mainly due to NAFTA’s restrictive RoO (Chapter III, p. 54).
However, as I have argued previously, this paper is not concerned with the
“static” outcome of PTAs. Rather, it takes a dynamic approach, observing other potential
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See for example, Krueger (1999b); Soloaga and Winters, 2001; Gould, 1998; and World Bank, 2003 (in
Lesher and Miroudot, 2005, p. 31).
126

See for example, ITC, 1997; Fukao, Okubo and Stern, 2003 (in Lesher and Miroudot, 2005, p. 31), and
more recently, Cadot et. al. (2005).
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benefits that might have resulted from market access and inward foreign investment,
which presumably have both increased (figures III.1, III.2 and IV.1). Hence, it is only
adequate to analyze the dynamic gains that might have matured to Mexico, namely
physical capital formation and economic activity, employment and wages, technological
spillovers, and human capital and skill enhancement.
First, in Chapter II (p. 28), it was concluded that a PTA enlarges the market, and
so, it presents the opportunity to generate physical capital formation and economic
activity from exploiting economies of scale and productivity gains. However, given the
discussion in Chapter III, this opportunity was largely reduced in Mexico simply because
there was very little actual market access, despite the significant increased in exportflows. In part, this was due to NAFTA’s overall structure and restrictive RoO, but it was
also largely due to consumption patterns differences in NAFTA as well as Mexico’s
supply capacity constraints.
Foreign investment should have also contributed to physical capital formation and
economic activity, since FDI tremendously increased (figure IV.1). However, also due in
part to the unrestrictive NAFTA’s investment provisions that were given to foreign
investors (Chapter IV, p. 84), the Mexican government’s ability to direct it towards its
development goals was largely reduced. This resulted on enclave FDI destinations, areas
and sectors, highly disarticulated from the rest of the economy (figures IV.2 and IV.3)
and on large capital flights due to “transfer-pricing”.127 As a result, gross fixed capital
formation (GFCF) as a share of GDP has remained at around 20%, which is below the

127

Ramirez (2003) reports that remittances of profits and dividends more than double between 1990 and
2000, going from US$2.3 to US$5.2 billion, or 55.6% in average of the FDI inflows.
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25% level generally understood to be required for a sustained process of catch-up growth
in a middle-income country such as Mexico (UNCTAD, 2007b).
Second, as presumed by NAFTA promoters and concluded in Chapter II (p. 29),
the agreement should have resulted on more and better paid jobs. However, in reality, as
Ramirez (2003) puts it, employment growth and real wages in Mexico during NAFTA
have been lackluster at best and disastrous at worse (see figure V.1). Some recent
statistics (based on “official” unemployment) have tried to show the positive impact that
NAFTA has had on Mexico’s unemployment, which has dropped from 6.4% in 1995 to
almost a constant level between 2.5% and 3.0% thereafter (Ramirez, 2003).128 But even
the Mexican government has admitted the low reliability of these measures due to the
large informal employment sector that currently accounts for almost one third of the
Mexican labor force (ibid). Indeed, many argue that a better measure for Mexico’s
unemployment rate must include the underemployed labor force, which has remained
constant, or even increased, during the NAFTA period – at around 20%.
There were jobs created during the first years of NAFTA, which resulted in a
1.2% annual growth rate, but that was well below the 2.5% needed to absorb the yearly
1.2-1.5 million new entrants (Ramirez, 2003). After 2000, however, in part due to the
2001 US recession, and in part due to China’s competition after its WTO accession, job
creation has decreased even in the most vibrant sector, the maquiladora plants, which
have been directly impacted by NAFTA factors. This is in spite of 45% productivity
increase on average (figure V.1). Moreover, Arroyo Picard et. al. (2003) point out that
NAFTA jobs have not been good jobs. They have been low paying jobs without any
128

See also Sàinz, 2006 (in UNCTAD, 2007b, p. 77).
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basic benefits. Likewise, the performance of real wages has not been the exception.
There has been a steady erosion of purchasing power of both minimum and average
wages in the ‘90s, loosing 23% of its value between 1993 and 1999 (Ramirez, 2003).
Figure V.1. Labor Factor in Mexican Manufacturing Branches: 1993-2000
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Thirdly, as discussed in Chapter II (p. 30), technology upgrading is perhaps the
most important factor of growth in today’s highly technological world. Hence, benefiting
in this area might have been one of Mexico’s greatest gains from increasing trade and
investment activity with two of the world’s top innovators. Unfortunately, measuring
technological spillovers resulting from a PTA is not a simple task. Nonetheless, some
authors such as Lall (2000b) have attempted to do so, by analyzing the evolution of the
technology embedded in traded goods.
UNCTAD (2007b) takes the same approach in the case of Mexico during
NAFTA. This study points out that a large part of Mexican exports during NAFTA have
been high skill and technologically advanced products.129 However, this does not imply
that Mexican production systems have been upgraded, for that high-technology products
may result from low-technology processes. This is because the large bulk of imports to
Mexico are already high skilled and technologically advanced products, allowing mere
129

UNCTAD (2007b, p. 73) reports that only 17% of manufactured Mexican exports are characterized by
low-skill-technology.
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assembly activities with low skill and technological content to take place in the Mexican
side of the border. This suggests, as UNCTAD (2007b) further argues, a relatively
insignificant change in the technological base of Mexico. Rather, Mexico has been
locked-in in the exploitation of its initial comparative advantage, low-cost and abundant
labor. Partially, as previously discussed, all this can be attributed to factors such as
NAFTA’s overall trade and investment design as well as its restrictive IPR package,
Mexico’s low absorbing capacity, and most importantly, to the overall passive role of the
government in the process.
Lastly, NAFTA could have contributed to Mexico’s human capital and skill
enhancement (Chapter II, p. 32). However, this is still a mere theoretical argument quite
difficult to put into practice because an extensive package of domestic policies and an
active role of local agents are both required (Lee, 2005). Besides, these benefits are not
easy to be captured and measured. Nonetheless, some insights (non-NAFTA related) can
highlight how much Mexico could have benefited from NAFTA in this area.

For

example, one could look at the Human Development Index (HDI), before and during
NAFTA, (see figure V.2). But although it shows a gradual improvement, it leaves the
open question of what would have happened had Mexico invested more on education.130
Moreover, some studies in Miyamoto (2003, p. 29) show that only 11% of TNCs in
Mexico invested in in-house training compared to figures ranging from 65 to 75% in
other countries such as the Philippines, Singapore, and China.
130

Compared to US and Canada, Mexico still lags largely behind as far as years of schooling and
expenditure on education per inhabitant, demonstrating Mexico’s workers level of skill compared to that of
its NAFTA partners. Guisan et. al. (2003, p. 7) report that in average during the period of 1995-99 the years
of schooling in Mexico were at 6.55 compared to 12.21 in the US. Moreover, Mexico spent US$500 per
year (at 1999 prices and PPPs), which is less than a third of that in the US.
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Figure V.2. Historical Trend of Mexico’s HDI, 1975-2005.
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To sum up, Mexico could have largely benefited from NAFTA as it was predicted
by both trade theory and estimates in the run-up, but unfortunately due to all the
circumstances discussed throughout this thesis, the overall positive effect has been quite
modest and even negative in some instances.131 Not only the Mexican economy did not
grow anywhere close to the 12.7% predicted by some estimates above, but it actually has
performed worse than in previous periods (figure V.3). Moreover, as Arroyo Picard et.
al. (2003) point out, during NAFTA, GDP per capita growth in Mexico has being at the
second lowest level during its the entire modern history since the 1930’s with the
exception of the 1982 crisis (figure V.4).132 In short, in describing NAFTA’s impact on
Mexico, an anecdotal medical proverb comes to mind: “the surgery was successful, but
the patient died”. In the sense that NAFTA succeeded in doing what it was set out to do,
it increased trade and foreign investment flows, but Mexico did not ultimately succeed in
kicking off its economic development process.
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Several studies support this argument; see for example, Arroyo Picard et. al. (2003); Ramirez, (2003);
UNCTAD, (2007b), which in p.67 lists numerous other studies, such as Moreno-Brid, Ruiz Nàpoles and
Rivas Valdivia, 2005, Hufbauer and Scott, 2005, Blecker, 2003, and Audley et. al. 2003.
132

See the cited authors for a more detailed discussion of Mexico’s GDP per capita growth, before and
during the years of NAFTA. See also Figure V.8, which is based on UNCTAD data, reflecting similar
trends, and also compares Mexico’s figures with that of the ASEAN-10.
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Figure V.3. Trends of Mexico GDP Growth Rates
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Figure V.4. Trends of Mexico’s GDP Per Capita Growth Rates
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5.2. ASEAN-10’s Economic Development Evolution
As mentioned before, disentangling the effects of trade and investment schemes
on economies can be a very challenging task. Indeed, this has been the case of NAFTA’s
impact on Mexico, which, to a certain extent, has been a more evident process, providing
more available data. What this means is that at least NAFTA was implemented all at
once in a single package. Hence, proving a “reliable” assessment of the impact that the
ASEAN schemes have had on the economic development of the economies involved,
which among other factors, entered at different times into the agreements can be an
almost impossible endeavor.

Nonetheless, mainly following the above structure on

NAFTA’s impact on Mexico, this section attempts to provide some insights that may
loosely reflect ASEAN schemes’ impact on the ASEAN-10.
ASEAN (as whole) has been a long-lived association mainly born out political
tensions among countries in Southeast Asia, and it has been subject to continuous (up to
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date) modifications.133

Although, “the acceleration of economic growth and social

progress” is explicitly listed as the first objective of the agreement,134 ASEAN neglected
economic cooperation for the first 25 years of its existence while it mainly concentrated
on its second objective – “to promote regional peace and stability” (Cuyvers and
Pupphavesa, 1996). Unlike Mexico in NAFTA, which place all its development affords at
once on the NAFTA project, the ASEAN members have taken the time to understand the
potentials of regional integration and have also diversified their development projects in
many different unilateral initiatives.
The slow progress of ASEAN integration, as pointed out in Cuyvers and
Pupphavesa (1996), has been justified due to the fact that, at the early stages, the country
members were hardly, if at all, complementary economies. They all followed widely
different development strategies, from free trade in Singapore, to export promotion in
Thailand and Malaysia and import substitution in Indonesia and the Philippines. ASEAN
had to wait until the liberalization policies in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Thailand in the second half of the 1980s, to find the economic policy priorities between
the ASEAN-countries as sufficiently converged in order to allow for the next steps in
economic cooperation. Something that was not seen at all in the case of the NAFTA
members, which engaged immediately in a reciprocal economic cooperation despite of
the asymmetries between Mexico and the other members.

133

It has increased the number of members from 5 to 10; it has formed various schemes, among them a
PTA in 1977, and several projects for industrial cooperation such as AIP, AIC, and AIJV, culminating with
the formation of AFTA, AIA, and AICO during the ‘90s. Moreover, ASEAN has stated talks about
creating European Union like bloc by the year 2020 – the ASEAN Economic Community (see Shimizu,
2007 for further discussion) (also see Chapter III).
134

For an original version of ASEAN objectives go to: http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htm
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Substantial economic integration among ASEAN members occurred until 1992
with the formation of AFTA. Like NAFTA, the main objectives of this FTA were to
liberalize trade and stimulate foreign investment in the region. In addition, ASEAN
members created other schemes (AIA and AICO) in order to further attract foreign
investment (Chapter IV). But unlike NAFTA, these schemes were much less identified
as projects that would bring the ASEAN-10 out of their developing country status.
ASEAN Schemes were not preceded by any “number-crunching”. As Cuyvers
and Pupphavesa (1996) put it, the mood was to: “Agree First, Talk Later”. However, the
few estimation studies of the economic (static) impact on the ASEAN economies
generally expressed an insignificant effect, mainly among other reasons due to the
relative similar factor endowments, low trade patterns among members, and to the overall
characteristics embraced in a S-S PTA as discussed in Chapter I. The main prediction
was that AFTA would mostly result on trade diversion,135 and AIA and AICO would
have a trivial impact on inward foreign investments.
The actual outcomes have been tested by several authors with a quite mixed set of
results. For example, Hapsari and Mangunsong (2006), using gravity models, conclude
that AFTA overall has been a trade-diverting agreement. However, Cernat (2003), also
using gravity models, concludes that AFTA has been one of the best performing current
S-S PTAs, resulting in trade creation, despite of its slow process of integration. Yet,
other studies, such as those done by Hakim (2004) and Tho (2002), conclude that at the
disaggregated level (countries instead of sectors), AFTA has resulted in trade creation for

135

For example, Cuyvers and Pupphavesa (1996, p. 11) cite studies, such as Nadal De Simone (1996: 106)
and Chirathivat (1996: 29), which calculated that trade liberalization under AFTA will induce for the
ASEAN countries hardly 3 o 4 billion US dollars, and mainly result on trade diversion.
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some members and trade diversion for others but overall trade creation with the rest of
the world.136 In addition, as highlighted in chapters III and IV, there are studies that have
tested the actual efficiency of the ASEAN schemes in meeting their initial goals, which
were to increase trade and inward foreign investment.

One example is Elliot and

Ikemoto, 2004 (in Lendle, 2007, p. 6), which suggests that AFTA had no impact on intraASEAN trade.137

In regards to foreign investment, Plummer and Cheong (2008)

conclude that AIA in particular has had an overall positive impact on intra-ASEAN FDI
flows, but it has not have any impact on extra-ASEAN flows.
Again, this research is not as concerned with the static outcomes of PTAs as it is
on the dynamic benefits that can be obtained from them. Indeed, supporters of the
ASEAN schemes, especially AFTA, vindicated that the real benefits were be obtained
from the dynamic effects on economic growth, as pointed out by Cuyvers and
Pupphavesa (1996, p. 11), who refer to studies such as Yap and Edillon (1993), Imada
(1993), and Ramasamy (1994 and 1995). Therefore, below I will present a brief review
of the potential dynamic gains that the ASEAN-10 could have accrued.
First of all, because AIA reserves the right to restrict transfer-pricing if it deems
necessary (Chapter IV, p. 80), it could be expected that the ASEAN-10 would have
gained more from inward FDI, not only to accumulate physical capital, but also to reduce
financial instability during the time of crisis, thereby preventing large capital flights. As
a matter of fact, this right has been evoked by Malaysia during the Asian Crisis of 1997
136

Note that most of these studies confined their research, mainly for data restrictions, to the five largest
members of ASEAN (Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines).
137

Lendle (2007, p. 6) suggests that this is not very surprising given the evidence for low tariff utilization
rates. He refers to empirical evidence (p.9) from Baldwin (2006), who reports that, for example, utilization
rates in 2002 have only been 4% for Malaysia and 11% for Thailand.
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(UNCTAD, 2007b). Another factor that could have influenced the retention of inwardFDI and eventually convert it into physical capital is the fact that foreign invertors in the
ASEAN zone are much more diversified, coming from both developed and DCs (Chapter
IV).138 However, figure V.5 reflects a different story, mainly for Thailand and Indonesia,
but it also seems to have had some positive influence on Cambodia and Vietnam. Of
course, this data is a mere illustration of the physical capital formation trends that have
been taking place in ASEAN, and it is not to be interpreted as a result of PTA
envelopments in the area. Rather, other factors such as the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis
could have had a real direct impact.
Figure V.5. Gross Capital Formation Trends in the ASEAN-10.
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Secondly, it appears that the effect of any aspect of economic integration and/or
PTAs on employment is still mostly a theoretical argument. At least, specific studies at
the disaggregated-sector and subgroup level are needed to capture the dynamic impact
that a particular PTA could have on employment and wages, as Jansen and Lee (2007)
argued. Several studies have been undertaken in the case of NAFTA and its impact on
Mexico’s employment. However, this is not the case, to my knowledge, in the ASEAN
countries.

Therefore, my discussion in this respect will be limited to observe the

138

UNCTAD (2006d) reports that, in average during the ‘90s TNCs from developed countries have tended
to repatriate a larger portion of their profits (50 to 60%) than TNCs from DCs, which suggests that TNCs
from DCs reinvested more of their profits in the local economy, increasing the opportunity to increment
total physical capital formation for the host economy.
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“official” unemployment trends in the ASEAN-10 during the period of AFTA (table
V.1). From observing table V.1, can be concluded that AFTA did not have any particular
positive impact on the ASEAN-10 employment levels. Rather, it seems that it has
negatively affected some countries such as the Philippines, and Indonesia. Note also,
however, that the figures below might be even worse if rural and disguised
unemployment as well as underemployment are included as in the case of Mexico.
Nonetheless, ASEAN authorities have identified and recognized this social problem and
have started regional cooperation in tackling the existent high unemployment level along
with the process of economic integration.139
Table V.1. Unemployment Rate in ASEAN-10

Source: ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Statistical Yearbook (2005).

Thirdly, as in the case of Mexico, assessing how much the ASEAN-10 have
benefited from technology spillovers resulting from increased trade and inward FDI can
be proven quite challenging. Nonetheless, there are some differences between NAFTA’s
FDI regulations and the ASEAN schemes, especially AICO, that might suggest that the
ASEAN countries could have gained more in this area. First, the approach to IPR
regulation in ASEAN has been more relaxed than in the case of NAFTA, which can be
139

See for example, the various initiatives started in 2006 by ASEAN authorities, aiming at improving
social problems in ASEAN, such as poverty and unemployment (http://www.aseansec.org/21009.htm).
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proven to be beneficial for the technology upgrading of the ASEAN-10 given their level
of economic development (Chapter IV, p. 80-81).140

Second, and certainly more

important, the set up of the AICO scheme has allowed the ASEAN-10 to have some sort
of policy space to strategically direct inward FDI projects. This is because it requires
foreign investors to engage in some sort of “sharing”, including technology, creating a
more “restrictive” regime for foreign investors as far as performance requirements and
local content usage (Chapter IV, p. 93). As such, AICO has “required” TNCs to form a
more interactive atmosphere with local firms, increasing the potential for technology
transfers and diffusion.141
Contrary to the believe that restrictive FDI regimes discourage foreign investors,
recent statistics show that many TNCs, mainly auto-makers such as Toyota, Honda,
Nissan, and other US and European firms, have shown tremendous interest on the AICO
projects. Shimizu (2007) reports that, by July 2006, there were 141 approved AICO
ventures, generating US$1.7 billion in traded goods. Moreover, 150 applications, from
American companies alone, are been currently processed (US-ASEAN Business Council,
2008). These projects have enabled the ASEAN-zone to emerge as an important player
in the auto industry, not only in the production of foreign brands, but also, progressively,
in the production of home-grown brands. For example, Shimizu (2007, p. 84) documents
that Toyota has began to produce a strategic world car: the Innovative International
Multipurpose Vehicle (IMV) in Thailand for the first time in the world in August 2004,
which hardly depends on Japanese parts, and it is not based on any Japan-made model.
140

See Lall and Albaladejo (2002) for a detailed discussion on IPR and the level of development.

141

UNCTAD (2006d, p. 187) reports that 33% of TNCs in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines,
and Thailand sourced from local inputs, compared to a mere 1-3% in Mexico.
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Although this project has been mainly concentrated in Thailand, it has created a
wide intra-regional production network, which mainly sources from other ASEAN
countries that complement the production chain (ibid).

Hence, it could be loosely

concluded that the ASEAN schemes have contributed somewhat to the overall ASEAN
technology base, something that has hardly occurred in the case of Mexico.
Lastly, the ASEAN-10 could have also benefited from increased trade and inward
FDI in the area of human capital and skill enhancement, but as I already mentioned, it is
quite difficult to capture and measure such benefits. As in the case of Mexico, the HDI in
the ASEAN-10 seems to have been gradually improving without any important variations
during the period of all the ASEAN schemes (figure V.6). But again, is quite irrelevant
to base any judgments on this index. Rather, some other observations can provide better
insights of how the ASEAN-10 have been evolving in this area in order to be able to
capture a greater part of the benefits potentially provided. Also, it is important to point
out the wide differences in the overall level of education and skill available among
ASEAN members. This could have resulted on a biased distribution of this type of
dynamic gains from economic regional integration.
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Nonetheless, the ASEAN members have associated efforts in diverse areas that
can improve the human capital stock of the entire zone allowing for an increase in the
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absorbing capacity of all members. For example, there has been created an ASEAN
University Network, promoting general education in the fields of science and technology.
Also, aggregate cooperation has emerged in the areas of health and nutrition, culture and
information, drugs and narcotics, and disaster management, among others (ASEAN
Secretariat, 2007b).142 Unfortunately, the same developments have not been seen in the
case of NAFTA, where “deep-integration” has not gone beyond exploiting trade and
investment opportunities.
To sum up, despite some of the difficulties encountered in pointing out the
dynamic benefits that the ASEAN-10 could have obtained from engaging in their
respective trade and investment schemes and the overall mixed results from static
models, it seems that, at the aggregate level the ASEAN-10 have somewhat largely
benefited from AFTA, AIA, and AICO as far as pure economic performance is
concerned. This is reflected on their relatively high constant annual GDP growth rates,
before and during the period of these schemes (figure V.7). Although the five largest
members, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, were severely
hit by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, they were able to bounce back after the year 2000.
On the other hand, the ASEAN schemes seem to have paid extremely well to the late
ASEAN joiners, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, hitting record high
growth rates since their ASEAN membership (figure V.7).
Moreover, GDP per capita growth appears to have evolved in the same matter as
GDP growth for all members (figure V.8). It slightly dropped during the 1997 Crisis for
the founding members, but recuperated immediately after. And, it has been sharply
142

For further information on these developments go to: http://www.aseansec.org/8558.htm.
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increasing for the late ASEAN comers (BCLMV) at impressive rates right after their
membership into ASEAN, going from an annual growth rate of mere 0.66% during the
‘70s and ’80 to an aggregate 5.88% during the period of 2000 and 2005 (figure V.8).
Have the developments of economic integration in the ASEAN contributed to this? This
is perhaps an interesting subject for further and more detailed research. However, one
thing seems to be quite evident. There have been important differences in the way in
which economic integration is taking place in Southeast Asia and in North America that
might have had a significant impact on the development of the DCs involved, which can
be reflected on the final overall economic performance of Mexico and the ASEAN-10.
Figure V.7. GDP Annual Growth Rate in Mexico and the ASEAN-10
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Figure V.8. GDP Per Capita Growth Rate of Mexico and the ASEAN-10
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2000 - 2005

CONCLUDING REMARKS
It is hoped that the main conclusions have already been drawn and understood
from the various discussions throughout the corpus of this research. However, there are a
few points that I would like to highlight in this concluding section by way of
summarizing the main ideas embedded in this thesis.
First, it is granted that economic integration can be conducive to development.
Thus, the fact that many DCs have engaged in “integration agreements” may well result
in speedier development. However, it has also been noted that external integration has to
synergize with an intensive process of internal integration if benefits are to be reaped.
This is where it is important to remember that whether development would indeed
materialize depends on the content of whatever integration agreement that is reached and
the relative state of development of each of the signatories to the agreement (the latter
consideration of which may shape the content of an agreement more in favor to some).
The state of development of each country at any time is the cumulative result of the
historical interactions of both internal and external economic (and in many cases, social)
forces. The content of any integration agreement in some sense defines how the external
forces would either support or obstruct the forces of internal integration when the
agreement is implemented, and thus would shape the future path and trajectory of
development of the countries concerned.
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Indeed, and this second point follows directly from the first, in analyzing two
current PTAs, NAFTA and ASEAN, this research has shown how important it is to
examine the content of each PTA. Thus, while they do involve the conventional “market
access” issues (Chapter III), they also cover, among other channels of integration,
international investment (Chapter IV). More fundamentally, the close scrutiny in those
chapters indicate that the relative bargaining power (which partly reflect the relative state
of development) and the general structural asymmetries among different members shape
the overall “integration intention” of each agreement, and thus result in differing
“readiness” of each member to benefit from the opportunities presented.
These considerations have without a doubt played a crucial role in the
developmental effects that NAFTA has had on Mexico thus far, in which integration has
not gone beyond the mere exploitation of trade and investment opportunities by the
stronger players in the field. On the other hand, the process of integration in Southeast
Asia, although slow, has been taking a more development-friendly approach. This is not
only because many of the aspects present in NAFTA were not of much concern in
ASEAN, but also because ASEAN has been designed to ultimately embrace other
important development aspects of economic integration and collectively address them.
The second point above is a sad reminder, and here is my third point, that the
current available theories on which most assessments of PTAs are based, traditional trade
theories, unfortunately contain serious short comings.

They largely omit from the

analysis or simply take for granted many the other aspects of economic integration
essential for growth and development.

Consequently, misleading conclusions are

presented concerning the potential benefits of forming a PTA, and the form and design
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they should take in order to spur the development process of the DCs involved in such
schemes. Also, it is important to highlight that these theories are based on very shaky
grounds and lack conclusive empirical support (Deraniyagala and Fine, 2001).
Fourth, it is also necessary to stress the fact that this comparative analysis has not
attempted to present a “quantitative” assessment of the PTAs studied here. Rather, it has
taken a “qualitative” approach, considering other aspects of economic integration
typically excluded from conventional thinking. Indeed, given the shortsighted approach
of traditional trade theories, an increasing body of literature is diverting from their
postulates.143 Unlike orthodox evaluations that can result in different outcomes from the
same subject of study (a certain PTA) because the use of different data sets, assumptions,
and interpretations of the results, the overall message from this new emerging literature
unanimously echoes the results obtained in this research. That is, N-S PTAs can be
beneficial for development, but given the many differences among members, the benefits
can be unequally distributed. On the other hand, in S-S PTAs, although there is low
potential for large benefits, the few benefits generated can be more equally distributed
among members. At least, the costs of trade and investment liberalization can be reduced.
Nonetheless, there is still a large untapped field for further “alternative” analysis
of PTAs in many other areas that were not covered in this research, for example, the
impact of foreign competition, the potential benefits that can be drawn from truly
liberalizing all production factors, such as labor and not only trade and capital. But most
importantly, future research in the area of economic integration must move away from

143

See for example, UNCTAD (2005 and 2007b); Hoekman (2005); Khor (2007); and Kreinin and
Plummer (2003).
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orthodox analysis into more dynamic and realistic consideration of many other variables
and circumstances that can offer reliable information to DCs in meeting their
developmental goals when engaging in a PTA. Ultimately, this alternative research could
also provide valuable insights to ensure that DCs actually benefit from trade and
investment negotiations at the multilateral level like the so-called “Development Round”
or Doha Round.
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